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Abstract
Software testing is an expensive and time-consuming process, often involving the manual
creation of comprehensive regression test suites. Current testing methodologies, however,
do not take full advantage of these tests. In this thesis, we present two techniques
for amplifying the effect of existing test suites using a lightweight symbolic execution
mechanism. We approach the problem from two complementary perspectives: first, we
aim to execute the code that was never executed by the regression tests by combining
the existing tests, symbolic execution and a set of heuristics based on program analysis.
Second, we thoroughly check all sensitive operations (e.g., pointer dereferences) executed
by the test suite for errors, and explore additional paths around sensitive operations.
We have implemented these approaches into two tools—katch and zesti—which we
have used to test a large body of open-source code. We have applied katch to all the
patches written in a combined period of approximately six years for nineteen mature
programs from the popular GNU diffutils, GNU binutils and GNU findutils application
suites, which are shipped with virtually all UNIX-based distributions. Our results show
that katch can automatically synthesise inputs that significantly increase the patch
coverage achieved by the existing manual test suites, and find bugs at the moment they
are introduced.
We have applied zesti to three open-source code bases—GNU Coreutils, libdwarf and
readelf—where it found 52 previously unknown bugs, many of which are out of reach of
standard symbolic execution. Our technique works transparently to the tester, requiring
no additional human effort or changes to source code or tests.
Furthermore, we have conducted a systematic empirical study to examine how code and
tests co-evolve in six popular open-source systems and assess the applicability of katch
and zesti to other systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Testing currently accounts for a large fraction of the software development life cycle [87]
and usually involves writing large numbers of manual tests that exercise various paths,
often with the objective of maximising a certain coverage metric such as line or branch
coverage. This is a tedious process that requires significant effort and a good under-
standing of the tested system.
As a result, we are witnessing a sustained research effort directed toward developing
automatic techniques for generating high-coverage test suites and detecting software
errors [8,15,16,24,27,33,45,90,97], with some of these techniques making their way into
commercial and open-source tools such as Coverity, Fortify or KLEE. However, these
techniques do not take advantage of the effort that developers expend on creating and
updating the manual regression suites, which we believe could significantly enhance and
speed up the testing process.
Our key observation is that well-written manual test suites exercise most program
features, but often use a limited number of paths and input values, potentially missing
corner case scenarios that the testers did not consider. In this thesis, we propose two
complementary automatic testing techniques that amplify the effectiveness of a regression
test suite. The first, katch, aims to create inputs that exercise previously unexecuted
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int v[100];
void f(int x){
  if (x > 99)
    x = 99;
  v[x] = 0;
}
(a) Regression testing
int v[100];
void f(int x){
  if (x > 99)
    x = 99;
  v[x] = 0;
}
(b) RT + katch
int v[100];
void f(int x){
  if (x > 99)
    x = 99;
  v[x] = 0;
}
(c) RT + katch + zesti
Figure 1.1: Example showing at a high-level the added benefits of katch and zesti
over regular regression testing (RT). katch synthesises inputs that execute additional
parts of the code, while zesti thoroughly checks already executed code. In this example,
zesti finds that a negative function argument triggers an invalid memory access.
code, thereby improving code coverage, while the second, zesti, checks the program
paths explored by the regression suite against all possible input values, and also explores
additional paths that slightly diverge from the original executions in order to thoroughly
check potentially dangerous operations executed by the program. Figure 1.1 depicts
these benefits using a simple example. Function f takes a single integer argument and
uses it to index a fixed-sized array. The regression tests have already exercised the
common scenario in which the function receives a small positive integer (Figure 1.1 (a))
but have not checked the function behaviour when the argument is outside the bounds
of the array. katch aims to exercises code not executed previously (Figure 1.1 (b)) and
therefore generates a large positive argument for the function, while zesti thoroughly
checks the already executed code and finds that a negative argument causes an invalid
memory access (Figure 1.1 (c)).
We envision both katch and zesti fully integrated in the software development cycle,
similar in spirit to a continuous integration system, as shown in Figure 1.2. When
developers create a new program version and add it to the repository, the systems auto-
matically explore paths through the code using dynamic symbolic execution, augmented
with several heuristics. The paths explored differ for the two systems: katch focuses
exclusively on exploring new code, while zesti’s goal is to thoroughly test the code
already exercised by the existing regression tests. Both approaches offer to the developers
15
patch
Figure 1.2: katch and zesti are integrated in the software development life cycle and
automatically find bugs and generate inputs that increase program coverage.
a set of test inputs which could be added to the regression suite and a report of any bugs
introduced by the patch, accompanied by actual inputs that trigger them.
To be adopted by developers, such systems have to meet several requirements: (1) they
have to be easy-to-use, ideally fully automatic; (2) they have to be fast, to encourage
developers to run them after every single commit; and (3) they have to demonstrate
“value” by finding bugs and generating inputs that cover more code through the patch
than existing manual test suites. In this thesis, we provide some promising evidence that
such systems could become a reality. In our experiments with katch we looked at all
the patches written in a combined period of around six years for nineteen applications.
katch was able to significantly increase the overall patch coverage and find fifteen
distinct bugs, while spending only a relatively short amount of time per patch. zesti
obtained promising results as well, finding two previously unknown bugs in Coreutils
(despite these applications having been comprehensively checked before via symbolic
execution [13, 16]), forty in libdwarf, and ten in readelf, in a manner completely
transparent to developers.
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The overall contribution of this thesis is to show that the effectiveness of standard regres-
sion tests can automatically be improved using symbolic execution-based techniques. We
propose two such techniques and show that they can find bugs that are often out of reach
for regression testing or standard symbolic execution alone. From a tester’s perspective,
these techniques are automatic and do not require tuning a symbolic execution engine
or deciding what symbolic inputs to provide to the program. More exactly:
1) We show through an empirical study the suitability of these techniques by building
a system for automatic extraction of static and dynamic software evolution metrics
from software repositories.
2) We present a first testing technique that combines symbolic execution with several
novel heuristics based on program analysis that effectively exploit the program
structure and existing program inputs to reach specific program points, and a
system called katch, based on the state-of-the-art symbolic execution engine
klee [16] that implements this technique for C programs. We thoroughly evaluate
our technique by applying it on all the patches made to nineteen programs in the
widely-used GNU diffutils, GNU binutils and GNU findutils application suites,
during a combined period of six years.
3) We introduce a second technique, complementary to katch, for reasoning about
all possible input values on the paths executed by the regression suite and for
thoroughly exploring additional paths around sensitive instructions such as dan-
gerous memory accesses, and demonstrate that this approach works well in practice
by implementing it in a prototype named zesti (Zero-Effort Symbolic Test Im-
provement). We have applied zesti to several popular open-source applications,
including the GNU Coreutils suite, the libdwarf library, and the readelf utility,
where it found 52 previously unknown bugs. Furthermore, the inputs generated
by zesti to reproduce the bugs discovered are almost well-formed, i.e. they differ
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only slightly from the inputs included in the regression suite, making it easier for
developers to analyse them.
4) We provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of zesti’s sensitivity to the quality
of the test suite, and discuss how the probability of finding a bug varies with the
number of test cases being considered.
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the essential back-
ground aspects related to our techniques, introduces symbolic execution, concolic testing
and regression testing, and explains the program analysis terminology and notations used
throughout the thesis.
Chapter 3 investigates through an empirical study the potential improvements that can
be made to regression testing. We analyse the evolution of static and dynamic metrics
in six widely used systems, focusing mainly on code coverage and its relationship to
codebase evolution and to bugs. In this chapter, we answer seven research questions
that aim to validate the assumptions that underlie katch and zesti. We analyse overall
program coverage and its evolution, but also patch coverage and latent patch coverage,
and finally correlate coverage with bugs extracted from the systems’ development history.
Our main results show that (1) there is a significant amount of code added to our
benchmark systems that is never executed by the regression tests and (2) many bugs lie
in code that has high coverage. The following two chapters describe two techniques for
automatic testing that are motivated by these observations.
Chapter 4 describes katch, a technique for automatically testing code patches. katch
targets patch code which is not executed by the regression tests. To this purpose it uses
a combination of symbolic execution and novel heuristics based on program analysis to
quickly reach the code of the patch. In the evaluation, we have applied katch to all
the patches written in a combined period of approximately six years for nineteen mature
programs from the GNU diffutils, GNU binutils and GNU findutils utility suites, which
are included in virtually all UNIX-based distributions. Our results show that katch can
18
automatically synthesise inputs that significantly increase the patch coverage achieved
by the existing manual test suites, and find bugs at the moment they are introduced.
Chapter 5 presents zesti, a technique complementary to katch. While katch mainly
aims to improve line coverage, zesti amplifies the effect of existing test suites using
a lightweight symbolic execution mechanism, which thoroughly checks all sensitive op-
erations (e.g. pointer dereferences) executed by the test suite for errors, and explores
additional paths around sensitive operations; zesti looks for bugs in already executed
code and, if appropriate, tries to exercise it on alternate paths. We have applied ZESTI
to three open-source codebases—coreutils, libdwarf and readelf—where it found 52
previously unknown bugs, many of which are out of reach of standard symbolic execution.
The technique works transparently to the tester, requiring no additional human effort or
changes to source code or tests.
We conclude the thesis with related work, briefly reiterate the thesis achievements
and discuss the applicability of the techniques presented in the broader context of
the software development lifecycle, examining opportunities for integration into existing
methodologies with minimal disruption.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces the general topics discussed in this thesis and provides definitions
for concepts relevant to this work. We start by discussing symbolic execution (§2.1) and
a variant that mixes concrete and symbolic execution, then present regression testing
(§2.2) and finally introduce several relevant program analysis concepts (§2.3). Related
work is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
2.1 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution is a technique for program testing and verification that was first
proposed several decades ago [52]. Driven by increased available computational power
and advances in constraint solving [25, 31], the technique received much attention in
recent years [17] due to its ability to systematically and exhaustively explore program
paths and reason about the program’s behaviour along each of them. Tools such as
KLEE [16], SAGE [36], JPF-SE [3], BitBlaze [82] and Pex [88] are just some of the
dynamic symbolic execution engines currently used successfully in academia and in
industry.
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1 if (input < 100)
2 f(input+100);
3
4 if (input > 200)
5 f(input)
6
7 void f(int idx) {
8 char x[999]
9 if (idx < 999)
10 x[idx] = 0;
11 }
Figure 2.1: Code snippet used to illustrate symbolic execution.
Intuitively, symbolic execution (SE) works by systematically exploring all possible pro-
gram executions and dynamically checking the safety of dangerous operations. SE
replaces regular program inputs with symbolic variables that initially represent any
possible value. Whenever the program executes a conditional branch instruction that
depends on symbolic data, the possibility of following each branch is analysed and
execution is forked for each feasible branch. To enable this analysis, symbolic execution
maintains for each execution path a set of conditions which characterise the class of
inputs that drive program execution along that path. At any time, the path conditions
can be solved to provide a concrete input that exercises that path natively, making it easy
to reproduce, report and analyse an execution of interest. SE also analyses all potentially
dangerous operations as they are executed, verifying their safety for any input from the
current input class. For example, reading from an array is safe on a certain execution
path if and only if the array index used can be proven to be positive and smaller than
the array size, given the current path conditions.
For example, during symbolic execution of the contrived code snippet in Figure 2.1,
execution will be split into two paths at the branch on line 1: one following the then side
of the branch, on which we add the constraint that input < 100, and one following the
implicit else side of the branch, on which we add the constraint that input ≥ 100. When
the path with the constraint input < 100 reaches line 4, only the else side is feasible,
so no other path is spawned at this point. On the other hand, when the path with the
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constraint input ≥ 100 reaches line 4, both sides are feasible, so execution is again split
into two paths, one on which we add the constraint that input > 200, and one on which
we add the constraint that input ≤ 200. Function f is hence called in two contexts:
first from line 2 when input < 100, and second from line 5 when input > 200. After
encountering the conditional at line 9, line 10 is reached with path constraints input <
100 ∧ input+100 < 999 and input > 200 ∧ input < 999 respectively. Finally, symbolic
execution checks whether the array indexing at line 10 can access invalid memory. It
does this by using a constraint solver to verify that the current path condition entails the
in-bounds access condition, i.e. whether input < 100 ∧ input+100 < 999 ⇒ input+100
≥ 0 ∧ input+100 < 999 and input > 200 ∧ input < 999⇒ input ≥ 0 ∧ input < 999
respectively. It can be seen that the implication is not valid in the former case, being
false for an input such as -101. Symbolic execution has thus found a fault and moreover,
can provide an actual input which triggers it.
Unfortunately, the number of execution paths in real programs often increases exponen-
tially with the number of branches in the code, which may lead symbolic execution to miss
important program paths. One solution is to employ sound program analysis techniques
to reduce the complexity of the exploration [5, 11, 34, 54]. An orthogonal solution
is to limit or prioritise the symbolic program exploration using different heuristics.
For example, directed symbolic execution methods [7, 21] use techniques such as static
analysis to find instructions or paths of interest which are then used to guide the symbolic
exploration. Chapther 6 discusses these techniques in more details.
Concolic execution [35, 77] is a variant of symbolic execution, which involves instru-
menting and running a program natively rather than building a full-fledged symbolic
interpreter. Concolic executors start from the path executed by a concrete input, which
they capture as an execution trace. Different program paths are then systematically
explored by flipping the truth value of the branch conditions collected in the trace. These
new sets of constraints are passed to a constraint solver which checks their feasability and
returns a satisfying assignment that acts as an input to the program in a new execution.
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For the same example from Figure 2.1 and the initial input 1000, concolic execution
starts by running the program using this input. This leads to the execution of lines 1,
4, 5 and 9. During execution, instrumentation embedded in the program gathers the
safety conditions for all memory operations and their associated path condition, and the
path conditions corresponding to branches not taken, i.e. input < 100 for line 1, input
≥ 100 ∧ input ≤ 200 for line 4, and input ≥ 100 ∧ input > 200 ∧ input < 999 for
line 9. Solving these constraints yields inputs which execute different paths through the
program: 0, 101, 201 for example. The process then repeats for each of these inputs until
no further unexplored feasible paths are found. When running the program on input 0,
concolic execution finds the fault on line 10, by determining that the path constraints
are not sufficient to guarantee the safety condition for the memory access, similarly to
symbolic execution.
Our approaches follow the concolic paradigm, starting from the manually written regres-
sion tests. This leverages the knowledge incorporated by the developers in the test suite
and inherently prioritises the exploration of paths from program features exercised by the
regression tests, motivated by two observations: (a) well-written manual tests exercise
the most important features for the correct functionality of the system and (b) testers
and developers generally test for the common scenario but sometimes fail to consider
corner cases.
2.2 Regression Testing
Practice has shown that as software evolves, emergence of new faults or reemergence
of previously fixed faults is quite common. This may happen because of fragile code,
unexpected interactions between different program features or simple human error. To
mitigate this problem, good coding practice warrants recording a test case whenever a
bug is found and fixed or when a new program feature is introduced. Together, all these
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test cases create a safety net, which is the foundation of regression testing, one of the
most popular testing techniques today.
At a minimum, regression testing involves maintaining the test suite consisting of pro-
gram inputs and their expected outputs, and using it to check that no regressions have
been introduced by a program change. Almost always a test driver such as automake1,
dejagnu2 or LLVM lit3, automates this process by providing each of the inputs, in turn,
to the subject program, monitoring its execution and checking its output against the
corresponding expected output. A tester then only needs to invoke this driver using a
command such as make check to run all the tests and obtain a report.
Both the advantages and disadvantages of regression testing stem from the manual effort
involved in writing the tests. On the one hand, developers have a thorough knowledge of
the system and are in the best position to provide inputs which exercise specific features,
fragile or complex code. On the other hand, developers may miss corner case inputs,
and do not usually test the code systematically since writing tests requires a significant
amount of time.
2.3 Program Analysis
Both katch and zesti use several static and dynamic analysis techniques for prioritising
the most promising paths during symbolic execution. This section contains background
information and definitions useful to make their presentation self-contained. We defer
the details of the actual analyses until later, in the context of the complete techniques.
A basic block is a maximal set of contiguous program instructions with only one entry
point and only one exit point. In consequence, whenever the first instruction in a basic
block is executed, the rest of the instructions are executed exactly once, in order.
1http://www.gnu.org/software/automake/
2http://www.gnu.org/software/dejagnu/
3http://llvm.org/docs/CommandGuide/lit.html
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1 if (input < 100)
2 f(0);
3
4 if (input > 100)
5 if (input > 200)
6 f(input)
7
8 void f(int x) {
9 if (x == 999)
10 abort()
11 }
START
END
1
2
4
5
6
9
10
FSTART
FEND
Figure 2.2: Code snippet and associated interprocedural control flow graph with return
edges omitted. Each basic block is labeled with the line number it corresponds to.
A control flow graph (CFG) is a representation, using graph notation, of a program. The
nodes of a CFG are the program’s basic blocks while directed edges represent jumps in
the control flow. The control flow graph representation is convenient for many analyses
such as reachability and domination.
A call graph is a directed graph which captures the calling relationship between pro-
cedures of a program. Each node corresponds to a procedure and each edge (p1, p2)
indicates that procedure p1 may call procedure p2.
An interprocedural control flow graph (iCFG) is a combination of a program’s call graph
and the control flow graph of each procedure. Specifically, each call graph node is
replaced with the control flow graph corresponding to its associated procedure, all edges
pointing to it are redirected to the procedure’s entry basic block and all edges pointing
out of it are assigned to the procedure’s basic blocks which contain the actual function
calls. Figure 2.2 shows a simple code snippet and its associated iCFG. For simplicity of
presentation, we consider all procedures to have a single exit block and we omit return
edges which, as we will show, are not relevant to our analyses.
A Hoare triple is a way of describing how a computation changes the state of a program.
It has the form {P}S{Q}, where P and Q are predicates and S is a (possibly compound)
statement. P and Q are called the precondition and the postcondition, respectively. The
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meaning of a Hoare triple is that when the precondition is met, the statement establishes
the postcondition.
Given a set of statements S, the weakest precondition associated with S is a function
from postconditions to preconditions. The weakest precondition, denoted wp(S,R) is
(1) a precondition, meaning that if wp(S,R) holds before executing S, then S terminates
and R holds after executing it, and (2) the weakest such precondition, meaning that for
any other precondition Q, Q → wp(S,R). The special case wp(S, true) is the weakest
precondition for termination of the block S.
A variable definition is a statement that assigns a value to the memory area associated
with the variable. A reaching definition relative to a program point P and a variable V
is a definition of V such that (1) there exists a path from the definition to P and (2) V
is not redefined along this path. A reaching definitions analysis is a program analysis
technique which finds all reaching definitions for a given program point and variable.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Analysis
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we set out to explore the evolution of six popular software systems with a
rich development history in order to asses the applicability of katch and zesti. In the
process, we build a framework for software analytics capable of extracting and analysing
static and dynamic metrics from a software repository.
Software repositories provide detailed information about the design and evolution of
software systems. While there is a large body of work on mining software repositories—
including a dedicated conference on the topic, the Working Conference on Mining Soft-
ware Repositories (MSR)—past work has focused almost exclusively on static metrics,
i.e. which can be collected without running the evolving software, e.g. number of lines
of code, code complexity [73], or supplementary bug fixes [70].
We suspect that the main reason behind the scarcity of studies focusing on dynamic
metrics lies in the difficulty of running multiple software versions,1 especially since doing
so involves evolving dependencies and unstable (including non-compilable) versions. For
example, prior work [101] cites the manual effort and the long time needed to run different
1In this thesis, we use the terms version and revision interchangeably.
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revisions as the reason for reporting dynamic measurements for only a small number of
versions.
While static metrics can provide useful insights into the construction and evolution of
software, there are many software engineering aspects which require information about
software executions. For example, the research community has invested a lot of effort
in designing techniques for improving the testing of software patches, ranging from test
suite prioritisation and selection algorithms [40, 75, 84] to program analysis techniques
for test case generation and bug finding [7,10,58,71,72,86,96] to methods for surviving
errors introduced by patches at runtime [46].
Many of these techniques depend on the existence of a manual test suite, sometimes
requiring the availability of a test exercising the patch [61,89], sometimes making assump-
tions about the stability of program coverage or external behaviour over time [46, 74],
other times using it as a starting point for exploration, as it is the case of katch (Chap-
ter 4), zesti (Chapter 5) and others [36,50,95], and often times employing it as a baseline
for comparison [16,23,28,69].
However, despite the key role that test suites play in software testing, it is surprising how
few empirical studies one can find in the research literature regarding the co-evolution
of test suites and code and their impact on the execution of real systems.
In this chapter, we present Covrig2—an infrastructure for mining software repositories,
which makes it easy to extract both static and dynamic metrics. Covrig makes use
of lightweight virtual machine technology to run each version of a software application
in isolation, on a large number of local or cloud machines. We use Covrig to conduct
an empirical study on program evolution, in terms of code, tests and coverage. More
precisely, we have analysed the evolution of three popular software systems with a rich
development history over a combined period of twelve years, with the goal of answering
the following research questions relevant to the applicability of katch and zesti:
2The name emphasises one of the core aspects of the framework, its ability to measure coverage.
Covrig also means bagel in Romanian.
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RQ1: Do executable and test code evolve in sync? Are coding and testing contin-
uous, closely linked activities? Or are periods of intense development alternating
with periods of testing? While katch and zesti can work with stale test suites,
efficiently checking new program features benefits from the existence of adequate
tests.
RQ2: Is code coverage deterministic? Does running the test suite multiple times
cover the same lines of code? If not, how many lines are nondeterministically
covered on average?
RQ3: How does the overall code coverage evolve? Is it stable over time? Does
the overall coverage increase steadily over time, or does it remain constant? Are
there revisions that significantly increase or decrease coverage? katch and zesti
leverage existing regression tests, hence their results depend on the quality of these
tests. A low coverage regression suite may not contain sufficient information to
efficiently guide symbolic execution
RQ4: What is the distribution of patch coverage across revisions? What fraction
of a patch is covered by the regression test suite? Does patch coverage depend on
the size of the patch? In particular, these questions seek to find whether katch
can be beneficial in the testing process as a result of low patch coverage in the
manual tests.
RQ5: What fraction of patch code is tested within a few revisions after it is
added, i.e. what is the latent patch coverage? Are tests exercising recent
patches added shortly after the patch was submitted? If so, how significant is this
latent patch coverage?
RQ6: Are bug fixes better covered than other types of patches? Are most fixes
thoroughly exercised by the regression suite? How many fixes are entirely executed?
RQ7: Is the coverage of buggy code less than average? Is code that contains bugs
exercised less than other changes? Is coverage a reasonable indicator of code qual-
ity? These question, along with RQ6 aims at providing more information about
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bug fixes, which are a prime candidate for testing, and explores the opportunities
that katch and zesti have to improve upon regression tests.
Our empirical results show that katch and zesti have the potential to improve the test-
ing process. The systems analysed have an adequate number of tests for our techniques
to leverage, have moderate to low patch coverage offering opportunities for improvement
and, in roughly half of the cases, faulty code was fully executed by the existing tests
without causing a failure, making symbolic execution a pefect fit for its ability to
thoroughly check a program’s execution of regression tests.
In addition to this study, we present an infrastructure called Covrig for dynamic (and
static) software repository mining, which makes it easy to mine software repositories
for dynamic metrics. At its core, Covrig makes use of lightweight virtual machine
technology to run each versions of a software application in isolation, on a large number
of local or cloud machines. While the design of Covrig was driven by our particular
study, we believe it could be easily adapted to other tasks involving mining software
repositories for dynamic information.
3.2 Covrig Infrastructure
The overall architecture of the Covrig infrastructure is depicted in Figure 3.1. It
contains a generic driver which iterates through all the revisions in a given range and
invokes routines specific to each system to compile, run, and collect statistics of interest.
Lightweight software containers. Covrig employs software containers [81], an
operating system-level virtualisation mechanism that provides the ability to run multiple
isolated virtual Linux systems (“containers”) atop a single host OS. When launched,
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Figure 3.1: Covrig infrastructure.
Covrig starts by loading the selected range of revisions from the project’s Git repository,
and for each revision starts a new software container. The use of containers offers
increased isolation and reproducibility guarantees by providing a consistent environment
in which to run each software revision and ensuring that different revisions do not
interfere with each other, e.g. by inadvertently leaving behind lock files or not properly
freeing up resources.
The choice of lightweight OS-level virtualisation rather than more traditional virtual
machines (e.g. KVM3 or Xen4) reduces the performance penalty associated with spawning
and tearing down VMs, operations performed for each revision analysed. To get a sense
of this difference, we compared an LXC5 container, which required under a second for
these operations, with a Xen VM, which needed over a minute.
In our implementation, we use Docker6 to create and manage the lower-level LXC
3http://www.linux-kvm.org/
4http://www.xenproject.org/
5http://linuxcontainers.org/
6https://www.docker.io/
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containers, and deploy them on multiple local or cloud machines. Each container is
used to configure, compile and test one program revision, as well as collect the metrics of
interest, such as code size and coverage. The containers are remotely controlled through
SSH using the Fabric7 framework.
Configuration file. Covrig has a modular architecture, which makes it possible to
analyse new systems with modest effort. A potential user of our infrastructure only needs
to provide a Python configuration file describing the system. A minimal file provides
the name of the system, its Git repository location, a method to compile the system,
e.g. install dependencies and run the appropriate make command, and a method to run
the regression tests, e.g. run the make test command. Finally, the configuration file can
also specify an end revision and a specific number of revisions to analyse. For accurate
test suite size measurements, the files or folders which make up the test suite can also
be indicated.
For each revision, Covrig collects several static and dynamic metrics. The static metrics
are obtained either directly from the version control system (e.g. the number of lines of
test code) or after compiling each revision (e.g. the number of executable lines of code).
The dynamic metrics require running the regression tests (e.g. the overall line coverage
or the regression test success status). Further information and graphs—including the
ones presented in our empirical study—are automatically derived in the post-processing
stage from these primary metrics using a set of scripts.
Bug data. One possible application of Covrig is finding useful data about software
bugs and correlating them with the static and dynamic metrics collected. For our study,
we mined bug data from both software repositories and, where available, bug tracking
systems. We automatically obtained a list of candidate bug-fixing revisions by iterating
through the list of commits and checking the commit message for words such as fix, bug
or issue, followed by a number representing the bug identifier. For example, a typical
Memcached bug fix commit message looks like “Issue 224 - check retval of main event
7http://fabfile.org/
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loop”. The regular expression that we used to identify these commits is similar to the
ones used in prior work [42]: (?:bug|issue|fix|resolve|close)\s*\#?\s?(\d+)
We confirmed that the bug identifier is valid by querying the associated bug tracking
system and we further manually checked all reported revisions and confirmed that they
included no false positives. While it is impossible to quantify the false negative rate
without a knowledgeable developer manually checking all the revisions in a repository,
we believe that the automatically obtained bug fixes create a representative subset of
the fixes in the repository.
Line mapping. The ability to track how lines move and change across revisions is the
cornerstone of many high-level software evolution analyses. A line mapping algorithm
improves over the traditional diff algorithm by tracking the movement of individual lines
rather than hunks. Conceptually, line mapping is a function which takes two revisions,
r1 and r2, and a program location described by a pair (file name 1, line number 1)
associated with r1. The output is a pair (file name 2, line number 2) identifying the
corresponding location in r2.
Covrig uses an external implementation of the line mapping algorithm, similar to the
algorithms described in previous work [18, 51, 80, 91]. It makes use of the Levenshtein
edit distance [57] to track line edits, and tf–idf [83] and cosine similarity [79] to track
line movements. It also uses the Hungarian algorithm [53] to find the optimal matching
of lines across versions.
In our study, we used line mapping to determine whether patches are tested within the
next few revisions after they were created (§3.3.3).
Cloud deployment. To enable large-scale data collection and processing, we deployed
Covrig to our private cloud. We have built our system around a standard set of tools:
Packer8 for building custom Docker-enabled machine images, Vagrant9 for controlling and
8http://www.packer.io/
9http://www.vagrantup.com/
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provisioning the virtual machines based on these images, a Docker registry for serving
Covrig’s Docker containers and a fabfile for orchestrating the entire cluster. The same
set of tools and scripts can be used to deploy Covrig to different private or public
clouds.
3.3 Code, Test and Coverage Evolution of Six Pop-
ular Codebases
We used the Covrig infrastructure to understand the evolution of six popular open-
source applications written in C/C++, over a combined period of twelve years. Our
empirical study has been successfully validated by the ISSTA 2014 artifact evaluation
committee, and received the best artifact award. The six evaluated applications are:
1. GNU Binutils10 is a set of utilities for inspecting and modifying object files,
libraries and binary programs. We selected for analysis the twelve utilities from the
binutils folder (addr2line, ar, cxxfilt, elfedit, nm, objcopy, objdump, ranlib,
readelf, size, strings and strip), which are standard user-level programs in many
UNIX distributions.
2. Git11 is one the most popular distributed version control systems used by the
open-source developer community.
3. Lighttpd12 is a lightweight web server used by several high-traffic websites such as
Wikipedia and YouTube. We examined version 2, which is the latest development
branch.
4. Memcached13 is a general-purpose distributed memory caching system used by
several popular sites such as Craigslist, Digg and Twitter.
10http://www.gnu.org/software/binutils/
11http://git-scm.com/
12http://redmine.lighttpd.net/projects/lighttpd2
13http://memcached.org/
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Table 3.1: Summary of applications used in our study. ELOC represents the number of
executable lines of code and TLOC the number of lines in test files in the last revision
analysed.
Code Tests
App Lang. ELOC Lang. TLOC
Binutils C 27,029 DejaGnu 5,186
Git C 79,760 C/shell 108,464
Lighttpd C 23,884 Python 2,440
Memcached C 4,426 C/Perl 4,605
Redis C 18,203 Tcl 7,589
ØMQ C++ 7,276 C++ 3,460
5. Redis14 is a popular key-value data store used by many well-known services such
as GitHub and Flickr.
6. ØMQ15 is a high-performance asynchronous messaging middleware library used
by a number of organisations such as Los Alamos Labs, NASA and CERN.
The six applications are representative for C/C++ open-source code: GNU Binutils are
user-level utilities, Git is a version control system, Lighttpd, Memcached and Redis are
server applications, while ØMQ is a library. All applications include a regression test
suite.
Basic characteristics. Table 3.1 shows some basic characteristics of these systems:
the language in which the code and tests are written, the number of executable lines of
code (ELOC) and the number of lines of test code (TLOC) in the last revision analysed.
To accurately measure the number of ELOC, we leveraged the information stored by the
compiler in gcov graph files, while to measure the number of TLOC we did a simple line
count of the test files (using cloc, or wc -l when cloc cannot detect the file types).
The code size for these applications varies from only 4,426 ELOC for Memcached to
79,760 ELOC for Git. The test code is written in a variety of languages and ranges from
14http://redis.io/
15http://zeromq.org/
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2,440 lines of Python code for Lighttpd to 108,464 lines of C and shell code for Git. The
test code is 36% larger than the application code in the case of Git, approximately as
large as the application code for Memcached, around 40% of the application code for
Redis and ØMQ, and only around 10% and 19% of the application code for Lighttpd
and Binutils respectively. Running the test suite on the last version takes only a few
seconds for Binutils, Lighttpd, and ØMQ, 110 seconds for Memcached, 315 seconds for
Redis, and 30 minutes for Git, using a four-core Intel Xeon E3-1280 machine with 16
GB of RAM.
The version control system used by all these applications is Git. Four of these projects—
Git,16 Memcached17, Redis,18 and ØMQ19—are hosted on the GitHub20 online project
site. The other two—Binutils21 and Lighttpd22—use their own Git hosting.
Selection of revisions. Our goal was to select a comparable number of revisions
across applications. The methodology was to start from the current version at the day
of our experiments, and select an equal number of previous revisions for all systems.
We only counted revisions which modify executable code, tests or both because this is
what our analyses look at. We ended up selecting 250 such revisions from each system
because some systems had non-trivial dependency issues further back than this, which
prevented us from properly compiling or running them. We still had to install the correct
dependencies where appropriate, e.g. downgrade libev for older versions of Lighttpd and
libevent for Memcached.
Note that not all revisions compile, either due to development errors or portability issues
(e.g. header files differing across OS distributions). Redis has the largest number of such
transient compilation error—38. The prevailing reasons are missing #include directives,
e.g. unistd.h for the sleep function, and compiler warnings subsequently treated as
16https://github.com/git/git.git
17https://github.com/memcached/memcached.git
18https://github.com/antirez/redis.git
19https://github.com/zeromq/zeromq4-x.git
20https://github.com/
21git://sourceware.org/git/binutils.git
22git://git.lighttpd.net/lighttpd/lighttpd2.git
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Table 3.2: Revisions used in our study. OK: code compiles and tests complete
successfully, TF: some tests fail, TO: tests time out CF: compilation fails, Time: the
number of months analysed, Age: the age of the project as of January 2014.
OK+TF+TO=250
App OK TF TO CF Time (mo) Age (mo)
Binutils 240 10 0 25 35 176
Git 249 0 1 0 5 105
Lighttpd 145 105 0 13 36 66
Memcached 206 43 1 5 47 127
Redis 211 38 1 38 6 57
ØMQ 171 79 0 11 17 53
errors. The missing #include directives most likely slipped past the developers because
on some systems other libc headers cause the missing headers to be indirectly included.
The compiler warnings were generated because newer compiler versions, such as the one
that we used, are more pedantic. Other reasons include forgotten files and even missing
semicolons.
We decided to fix the errors which were not likely to be seen at the time a particular
revision was created, for example by adding the compile flag -Wno-error in Binutils so
that the warnings do not terminate the build process. In all situations when we could
not compile a revision, we rolled over the changes to the next revisions until we found
one where compilation was successful. Revisions which do not successfully compile are
not counted towards the 250 limit.
Another important decision concerns the granularity of the revisions being considered.
Modern decentralised software repositories based on version control systems such as Git
do not have a linear structure and the development history is a directed acyclic graph
rather than a simple chain. Different development styles generate different development
histories; for example, Git, Redis and ØMQ exhibit a large amount of branching and
merging while the other three systems have a linear history. Our decision was to focus
on the main branch, and treat each merge into it as a single revision. In other words, we
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considered each feature branch a single indivisible unit. Our motivation for this decision
was twofold: first, development branches are often spawned by individual developers
in order to work on a certain issue and are often “private” until they are merged into
the main branch. As a result, sub-revisions in such branches are often unusable or
even uncompilable, reflecting work-in-progress. Second, the main branch is generally the
one tracked by most users, therefore analysing revisions at this level is a good match
in terms of understanding what problems are seen in the field. This being said, there
are certainly development styles and/or research questions that would require tracking
additional branches; however, we believe that for our benchmarks and research questions
this level of granularity provides meaningful answers.
On a secondary note, we remark that an additional complication with this approach is
that version control systems do not associate a branch name to each revision, so some
detective work might be required to follow the main development branch. However, since
the projects exhibiting a branching structure are hosted on GitHub, an implicit central
integrator exists (the project owner) and we considered their history to be the official
one, essentially always following the first parent in a merge.
Table 3.2 summarises the revisions that we selected: they are grouped into those that
compile and pass all the tests (OK ), compile but fail some tests (TF ), and compile
but time out while running the test suite (TO). The time limit that we enforced was
empirically selected for each system such that it is large enough to allow a correct revision
to complete all tests. As shown in the table, timeouts were a rare occurrence, with at
most one occurrence per application.
Table 3.2 also shows the development time span considered, which ranges from only 5-6
months for Git and Redis, which had a fast-paced development during this period, to
almost 4 years for Memcached. The age of the projects at the first version that we
analysed ranges from a little over 2 years for Lighttpd 2, to 11 years for Binutils.
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Setup. All the programs analysed were compiled to record coverage information. In ad-
dition, we disabled compiler optimisations, which generally interact poorly with coverage
measurements. For this we used existing build targets and configuration options if avail-
able, otherwise we configured the application with the flags CFLAGS=’-O0 -coverage’
and LDFLAGS=-coverage. All code from the system headers, i.e. /usr/include/ was
excluded from the results.
Each revision was run in a virtualised environment based on Ubuntu 12.10 (12.04.3 for
Git) running inside an LXC container. To take advantage of the inherent parallelism of
this approach, the containers were spawned in one of 28 long-running Xen VMs, each
with a 4 Ghz CPU, 6 GB of RAM, and 20 GB of storage, running a 64-bit version of
Ubuntu 12.04.3.
The following subsections present the main findings of our analysis: each one starts with
one or more research questions (RQ) that we attempt to answer in that section.
3.3.1 Code and Test Evolution
RQ1: Do executable and test code evolve in sync?
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of each system in terms of ELOC. As discussed above,
we measured the number of ELOC in each revision by using the information stored by
the compiler in gcov graph files. This eliminates all lines which were not compiled, such
as those targeting architectures different from our machine. One of the main reasons for
which we have decided to measure ELOC rather than other similar metrics is that they
can be easily connected to the dynamic metrics, such as patch coverage, presented in
Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
As evident from this figure, all six systems grow over time, with periods of intense
development that increase the ELOC significantly, alternating with periods of code
tuning and testing, where the code size increases at a slower pace. It is interesting
to note that there are also several revisions where the number of ELOC decreases (e.g.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of executable lines of code.
in ØMQ): upon manual inspection, we noticed that they relate to refactorings such as
using macros or removing duplicate code.
The total number of ELOC added or modified varies between 2,296 for Redis and
10,834 for Lighttpd, while the end-to-end difference in ELOC varies between 1,257 for
Memcached and 4,466 for Lighttpd.
Figure 3.3 presents the evolution of the size of the test suite in each system, measured
in textual lines of test code (TLOC). For each system, we manually identified the files
responsible for regression testing and recorded the number of lines contained in them at
each revision. It can be seen that test evolution is less dynamic than code evolution,
developers adding less test code than regular code.
To better understand the co-evolution of executable and test code, we also merged the
above data and plotted in Figure 3.4 only whether a revision changes the code (tests)
or not; that is, the Code and Test values increase by one when a change is made
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of textual lines of test code.
to the code, respectively to the tests in a revision, and stay constant otherwise. For
example, the Binutils plot shows that out of the 250 Binutils revisions analysed, over
200 modify code, but only about 70 modify tests. As it can be seen, while the Code line
is smoothly increasing over time, the Test line frequently stays constant across revisions,
indicating that testing is often a phased activity [101], that takes place only at certain
times during the development cycle. One exception is Git, where code and tests evolve
more synchronously, with a large number of revisions modifying both code and tests.
3.3.2 Overall Code Coverage
RQ2: Is code coverage deterministic?
As a large part of our study focuses on coverage metrics, we first investigate whether
code coverage is deterministic, i.e. whether the regression test suite in a given revision
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Figure 3.4: Co-evolution of executable and test code. Each increment represents a
change.
achieves the same coverage every time it is executed. As we show, nondeterminism has
implications in the reproducibility of test results—including the ones that we report—
and the fault detection capability of the tests.
We measured the overall coverage achieved by the regression test suite using gcov.
Interestingly, we found that all the programs from our experiments except binutils
are nondeterministic, obtaining slightly different coverage in each run of the test suite.
Therefore, we first quantified this nondeterminism by running the test suite five times
for each revision and measuring how many revisions obtained mixed results, i.e. one run
reports success while another reports failure. We were surprised to see a fair number of
revisions displaying this behaviour, as Table 3.3 shows in the Nondet Result column.
We further counted for each pair of runs the number of lines whose coverage status
differs. We used a 0/1 metric, i.e. we only considered a difference when one of the five
42
Table 3.3: Number of revisions where the test suite nondeterministically succeeds/fails,
and the maximum, median and average number of lines which are nondeterministically
executed in a revision.
Nondet. Nondet. ELOC
App. Result Max Median Average
Binutils 0 0 0 0
Git 1 23 13 11.80
Lighttpd 1 37 10 13.01
Memcached 21 22 8.5 7.55
Redis 16 71 23 30.98
ØMQ 32 47 27 19.52
runs never executes a line and another one executes it. We only did this for revisions in
which the test suite completes successfully to avoid spurious results that would occur if
we compare a run which completed with one that was prematurely terminated due to
a failure. As shown in Table 3.3, binutils seems to be completely deterministic with
respect to its test suite, while Redis, for example, contains on average 30.98 lines that
are nondeterministically executed.
We manually investigated the nondeterminism and pinpointed three sources: (1) multi-
threaded code, (2) ordering of network events, and (3) nondeterminism in the test
harness. As an example from the first category, the test from ØMQ test shutdown stress
creates 100 threads to check the connection shutdown sequence. In a small percentage
of runs, this test exposes a race condition.23 As an example in the third category,
some Redis tests generate and store random integers, nondeterministically executing
the code implementing the internal database data structures. The Memcached test
expirations.t is representative of tests that make assumptions based on hardcoded wall-
clock time values, which cause failures under certain circumstances. The test timings
were previously adjusted24 in response to failures under Solaris’ dtrace and we believe
that some of the failures that we encountered were influenced by the Docker environment.
23https://github.com/zeromq/zeromq4-x/commit/de239f3
24https://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/890e3cd
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Figure 3.5: Evolution of overall line and branch coverage.
The potential drawback of nondeterminism is the inability of coverage comparison across
revisions, lack of reproducibility and consequent difficulty in debugging. Developers and
researchers relying on test suite executions should take nondeterminism into account,
by either quantifying its effects, or by using tools that enforce deterministic execution
across versions [46], as appropriate. Tests with nondeterministic executions—such as the
ones presented above—are fragile and should be rewritten. For example, tests relying
on wall-clock time could be rewritten as event-based tests [47].
RQ3: How does the overall code coverage evolve? Is it stable over time?
When reporting the overall coverage numbers, we accumulated the coverage information
across all five runs.25 Therefore, the results aim to count a line as covered if the test
suite may execute it. The blue (upper) lines in Figure 3.5 plot the overall line coverage
25With the exception of Git, where for convenience we considered a single run, as the number of lines
affected by nondeterminism represent less than 0.3% of the total codebase.
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#define zmq_assert(x) \
do {\
if (unlikely (!(x))) {\
fprintf (stderr, "Assertion failed: %s (%s:%d)\n", #x, \
__FILE__, __LINE__);\
zmq::zmq_abort (#x);\
}\
} while (false)
Listing 3.1: Example of an assertion macro used in the ØMQ codebase.
for all benchmarks. It can be seen that coverage level varies significantly, with Binutils
at one end achieving only 17.39% coverage on average, and Git at the other achieving
80.74%, while in-between Lighttpd achieves 39.08%, Redis 59.97%, ØMQ 66.88%, and
Memcached 72.98%.
One interesting question is whether coverage stays constant over time. As evident
from Figure 3.5, for Binutils, Git, Memcached, and Redis, the overall coverage remains
stable over time, with their coverage changing with less than 2 percentage points within
the analysed period. On the other hand, the coverage of Lighttpd and ØMQ increase
significantly during the time span considered, with Lighttpd increasing from only 2.02%
to 49.37% (ignoring the last two versions for which the regression suite fails), and ØMQ
increasing from 62.89% to 73.04%. An interesting observation is that coverage evolution
is not strongly correlated to the co-evolution of executable and test code (RQ1). Even
when testing is a phased activity, coverage remains constant because the already existing
tests execute part of the newly added code.
One may notice that a few revisions from Lighttpd, Memcached and Redis cause a sudden
decrease in coverage. This happens because either bugs in the program or in the test
suite prevent the regression tests from successfully running to completion. In all cases,
these bugs are fixed after just a few revisions.
Figure 3.5 also shows that the branch coverage closely follows the line coverage. The
difference between line and branch coverage is relatively small, with the exception of
Memcached and ØMQ. The larger difference is due to the frequent use of certain code
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patterns which generate multiple branches on a single line, such as the one shown in
Listing 3.1, which comes from the ØMQ codebase. The zmq_assert macro is expanded
into a single line resulting in 100% line coverage, but only 50% branch coverage when
executed in a typical run of the program (where assertions do not fail).
The fact that line and branch coverage closely follow one another suggests that in many
situations only one these two metrics might be needed. For this reason, in the remaining
of the thesis, we focus only on line coverage.
Finally, we have looked at the impact on coverage of revisions that only add or modify
tests. An interesting observation is that many of these revisions bring no improvements
to coverage. For example, in Lighttpd only 26 out of 52 such revisions improve coverage.
The other 26 either do not affect coverage (18) or decrease it (8). The revisions which do
not affect coverage can be a sign of test driven development, i.e. the tests are added before
the code which they are intended to exercise. The revisions which decrease coverage are
either a symptom of nondeterminism—six of them, with small decreases in coverage—or
expose bugs or bigger changes in the testing infrastructure (the other two). These two
revisions exhibit a drop in coverage of several thousands lines of code. In one case, the
tests cause Lighttpd to timeout which leads to a forceful termination and loss of coverage
data. This problem is promptly fixed in the next revision. In the other case, the new
tests require a specific (new) module to be built into the server, terminating the entire
test suite prematurely otherwise.
3.3.3 Patch Coverage
RQ4: What is the distribution of patch coverage across revisions?
We define patch coverage as the ratio between the number of executed lines of code added
or modified by a patch and the total number of executable lines in the patch, measured
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Figure 3.6: Patch coverage distribution. Each colour bar represents a range of patch
coverage values with its size proportional to the number of patches with coverage in that
range.
in the revision that adds the patch. Low patch coverage is a strong sign that tools such
as katch can improve the testing process.
Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of the patch coverage for each system. Each column
corresponds to all patches which affect executable code in a system, normalised to 100%.
The patches are further grouped into four categories depending on their coverage. As
it can be observed, the patch coverage distribution is bi-modal across applications: the
majority of the patches in Git, Memcached and ØMQ achieve over 75% coverage, while
the majority of the patches in Binutils, Lighttpd and Redis achieve under 25%. One
interesting aspect is that for all applications, there are relatively few patches with
coverage in the middle ranges: most of them are either poorly (≤25%) or thoroughly
(>75%) covered.
47
Table 3.4: Overall patch coverage bucketed by the size of the patch in ELOC. NP is the
number of patches in the bucket and C is their overall coverage. Only patches which
add or modify executable code are considered.
≤10 11-100 >100
App NP C NP C NP C
Binutils 128 19.5% 63 25.0% 9 16.8%
Git 102 87.4% 65 82.4% 10 87.0%
Lighttpd 120 41.9% 58 31.3% 20 30.8%
Memcached 122 73.7% 73 70.8% 3 57.0%
Redis 164 33.8% 51 34.8% 4 21.1%
ØMQ 119 65.5% 64 68.0% 18 48.9%
Table 3.4 presents the same patch coverage statistics, but with the patches bucketed by
their size into three categories: less than 10 ELOC, between 11 and 100 ELOC, and
greater than 100 ELOC. For all benchmarks, patches are distributed similarly across
buckets, with the majority of patches having ≤ 10 ELOC and only a few exceeding 100
ELOC. Across the board, the average coverage of patches with ≤10 ELOC is higher than
for those with >100 ELOC, but the coverage of the middle-sized category varies.
Finally, the first column in Table 3.5 shows the overall patch coverage, i.e. the percentage
of covered ELOC across all patches. For Binutils, Git and Memcached, it is within five
percentage points from the overall program coverage, while for the other benchmarks
it is substantially lower—for example, the average overall program coverage in Redis is
59.97%, while the overall patch coverage is only 30.4%. These results show that tools
such as katch, which focus on executing previously uncovered code have the potential
to improve the testing process, find more bugs and improve confidence in the code’s
correctness. As we later show, katch can more than double the patch coverage of real
systems.
RQ5: What fraction of patch code is tested within a few revisions after it is
added, i.e. what is the latent patch coverage?
In some projects, tests exercising the patch are added only after the code has been
submitted, or the patch is only enabled (e.g. by changing the value of a configuration
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Table 3.5: Overall latent patch coverage: the fraction of the lines of code in all patches
that are only executed by the regression suite in the next 1, 5 or 10 revisions. The overall
patch coverage is listed for comparison.
App Overall +1 +5 +10
Binutils 21.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3%
Git 85.1% 0% 0% 0%
Lighttpd 31.3% 0.9% 5.0% 6.1%
Memcached 68.9% 2.1% 3.4% 3.5%
Redis 30.4% 5.2% 5.5% 6.4%
ØMQ 56.9% 0.4% 3.5% 6.0%
parameter) after related patches or tests have been added. To account for this develop-
ment style, we also recorded the number of ELOC in each patch which are only covered
in the next few revisions (we considered up to ten subsequent revisions). We refer to
the ratio between the number of such ELOC and the total patch ELOC as latent patch
coverage.
We counted these lines by keeping a sliding window of uncovered patch lines from the
past ten revisions and checking whether the current revision covers them. When a patch
modifies a source file, all entries from the sliding window associated with lines from that
file are remapped if needed, using the line mapping algorithm discussed in Section 3.2.
Table 3.5 shows the overall latent patch coverage i.e. the fraction of patch lines that are
covered in the next few revisions after the patch is introduced. We report the results
for three sliding window sizes: one, five and ten revisions. The latent patch coverage
is significantly smaller compared to the overall patch coverage, accounting at most for
6.4% in Redis, where, as previously pointed, the developers almost never add code and
tests in the same revision.
As conjectured, we found two main causes of latent patch coverage: tests being added
only after the patch was written (this was the case in Lighttpd, where 12 revisions which
only add tests cover an additional 74 ELOC) and patch code being enabled later on.
In fact, the majority of latent patch coverage in Lighttpd—337 lines—is obtained by 6
49
Table 3.6: Median coverage and the number of revisions achieving 100% coverage for the
revisions containing bug fixes. The overall metrics are included for comparison.
Coverage (med) Fully Covered
App Overall Fix Overall Fix
Memcached 89% 100% 45.4% 58.5%
Redis 0% 94.1% 25.5% 50.0%
ØMQ 76% 55.4% 33.3% 31.8%
revisions which change no test files. Upon manual inspection, we found that the code
involved was initially unused, and only later revisions added calls to it.
3.3.4 Bug analysis
RQ6: Are bug fixes better covered than other types of patches?
RQ7: Is the coverage of buggy code less than average?
To answer these RQs, we collected bug data according to the methodology presented in
Section 3.2 and we limited our analysis to the three systems which lend themselves to
automatic identification of bug fixes based on commit messages: Memcached, Redis and
ØMQ. The other three systems use non-specific commit messages for bug fixes, requiring
an extensive manual analysis or more complex algorithms such as machine learning and
natural language processing for understanding the contents of a specific revision [65].
We ignored revisions which do not affect executable files, such as fixes to the build
infrastructure or to the documentation and then manually confirmed that the remaining
revisions are indeed bug fixes [43] and further removed fixes which modify only non-
executable lines (e.g. variable declaration). We thus obtained 41 fixes in Memcached,
22 in Redis and 22 in ØMQ.
We measured the patch coverage of these revisions and report the median values in
Table 3.6, together with the corresponding overall metric, for comparison. For both
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Memcached and Redis, the coverage for fixes is higher than that for other types of
patches. For Redis, the median value jumps from 0% to 94.1%, while for Memcached
the difference is less pronounced. On the other hand, the fixes in ØMQ are covered less
than on average. The fraction of fixes which have 100% coverage follows the same trend.
To try to understand whether buggy code is less thoroughly tested than the rest of
the code, we started from the observation that bug-fixing revisions are usually only
addressing the bug, without touching unrelated code. Because of this, we can identify
the code responsible for the bugs by looking at the code which is removed or modified
by bug-fixing revisions and compute its coverage in the revision before the fix. The
coverage for this code is 72.7% for Memcached—roughly the same as the overall patch
coverage, 65.2% for Redis—much larger than the overall patch coverage, and 35.8% for
ØMQ—significantly lower.
While these numbers cannot be used to infer the correlation between the level of coverage
and the occurrence of bugs—the sample is too small, and the bugs collected are biased
by the way they are reported—they clearly show the limitations of line coverage as
a testing metric, with bugs even being introduced by patches which are fully covered
by the regression test suite. Therefore, even for well-tested code, tools such as zesti,
which thoroughly check each program statement for bugs using symbolic execution can
be useful in practice.
3.3.5 Threats to Validity
The main threat to validity in our study regards the generalisation of our results. The
patterns we have observed in our data may not generalise to other systems, or even to
other development periods for the same systems. However, we regard the selected systems
to be representative for open-source C/C++ code, and the analysis period was chosen
in an unbiased way, starting with the current version at the time of our experiments.
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Errors in the software underlying our framework could have interfered with our experi-
ments. Both Docker and LXC were under development and not recommended for use in
production systems at the time of our study. Furthermore, in case of some applications,
we have observed test failures caused by the AuFS26 filesystem used by Docker. However,
we have thoroughly investigated these failures and we believe they did not affect the
results presented in our study.
Given the large quantity of data that we collected from a large number of software
revisions, errors in our scripts cannot be excluded. However, we have thoroughly checked
our results and scripts, and we are making our framework and data available for further
validation.
3.4 Conclusion
Despite the important role that regression test suites play in software testing, there are
surprisingly few empirical studies that report how they co-evolve with the application
code, and the coverage level that they achieve. Our empirical study on six popular open-
source applications, spanning a combined period of twelve years, aims to contribute to
this knowledge base. To the best of our knowledge, the number of revisions executed in
the context of this study—1,500—is significantly larger than in prior work, and this is
also the first study that specifically examines patch coverage.
Our results indicate that both katch and zesti can potentially improve the effectiveness
of the testing process in real systems. On the one hand, most of the systems analysed
have reasonably good regression suites, which contain sufficient inputs to guide symbolic
execution. On the other hand, there is significant room for improvement both in terms
of overall coverage and patch coverage (RQ 3 and RQ 4), and in the thoroughness of the
checks done by the existing tests (RQ6 and RQ7).
26http://aufs.sourceforge.net/
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Our experience has revealed two main types of challenges for conducting similar or larger
studies that involve running a large number of program revisions. The first category
relates to the inherent difficulty of running older revisions:
1. Decentralised repositories have non-linear histories, so even defining what a revision
is can be difficult, and should be done with respect to the research questions being
answered. In our case, we chose a granularity at the level of commits and merges
to the main branch.
2. Older revisions have undocumented dependencies on specific compiler versions,
libraries, and tools. We found it critical to run each revision in a separate virtual
machine environment, to make it easy to install the right dependencies, or adjust
build scripts.
3. Some older revisions do not compile. This may be due to errors introduced during
development and fixed later, or due to incorrectly resolved dependencies. The
execution infrastructure has to be flexible in tolerating such cases, and one needs
a methodology for dealing with uncompilable revisions. In our case, we have
skipped over the uncompilable revisions and incorporated their changes into the
next compilable one.
4. The execution of the regression test suite is often nondeterministic—the test suite
may nondeterministically fail and some lines may be nondeterministically executed.
Studies monitoring the execution of the program need to take nondeterminism into
account.
The second category of challenges relates to reproducibility and performance. Our
Covrig infrastructure ensures reproducibility through the use of software containers
technology. Performance has two different aspects: at the level of an individual revision,
we have found it essential to use a form of operating system-level virtualisation (in our
case, Docker and LXC), in order to minimise the time and space overhead typically
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associated with hardware virtualisation. Across revisions, we found it necessary to
provide the ability of running our set of revisions on multiple local and cloud machines.
For example, running the Git regression suite took in our case 26 machine days (250
revisions × 30 min/revision × 5 runs), which would have been too expensive if we
used a single machine, especially since we also had to repeat some runs during our
experimentation.
We believe this study provides useful empirical evidence regarding the evolution of code
and tests in real software. We also hope it will encourage other similar studies, and to
this end we are working on transforming Covrig into a flexible extensible platform. We
also make our experimental data available at http://srg.doc.ic.ac.uk/projects/
covrig/.
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Chapter 4
katch
4.1 Overview
While the code of popular software systems is frequently changing, these changes—or
patches—are often poorly tested by developers, as we have shown in §3.3.3. In fact, as
we further report in §4.4.1, developers often add or modify lines of code without adding a
single test that executes them! To some extent, we have not found this result surprising,
as we know from experience how difficult it can be to construct a test case that covers
a particular line of code.
While the problem of generating inputs that cover specific parts of a program is generally
undecidable, we believe that in many practical circumstances it is possible to automat-
ically construct such inputs in a reasonable amount of time. Our system katch1 uses
several insights to implement a robust solution. First, katch uses existing test cases
from the program’s regression suite—which come “for free” and often already execute
interesting parts of the code—as a starting point for synthesising new inputs. For each
test case input, katch computes an estimated distance to the patch and then selects the
closest input (§4.2.2) as the starting point for symbolic exploration. Second, symbolic
1The name comes from K[LEE]+[P]ATCH. klee is an open-source symbolic execution engine on
which katch is based.
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Figure 4.1: The main stages of the katch patch testing infrastructure.
execution provides a framework for navigating intelligently through the intricate set of
paths through a program, starting from the trace obtained by running the previously
identified closest input. To reach the patch, katch employs three heuristics based on
program analysis: greedy exploration, informed path regeneration (§4.2.3) and definition
switching (§4.2.4).
Figure 4.1 presents the high-level architecture of katch. The framework takes as input
a program, a set of existing program inputs and a patch description in the form of a diff
file and automatically constructs new inputs that execute the patch code by following
three steps.
Patch preprocessing is responsible for parsing the raw patch file and splitting it into lines
of code. Lines of code that are part of the same basic block (and thus always executed
together), are grouped to form a single target. Targets which are already executed by
the program’s regression tests are identified by executing the tests, and dismissed at this
step. For each remaining target, the following stages are executed to synthesise an input
which exercises it.
Input selection leverages the fact that real applications already come with regression
suites that contain a rich set of well-formed inputs created by the developers. Input
selection takes as input the program, a target and an existing test suite. It then associates
with each of the test inputs a distance estimating the effort required to modify it such
that it executes the target. The closest input to the target is then used in the next stage.
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The last step combines symbolic execution with three heuristics based on program
analysis to derive a new input that exercises the target, starting from the input selected
at the previous step. The role of symbolic execution is twofold. First, it provides
a framework for inspecting the program branch decisions and their relation to program
inputs, and gives the means to generate new inputs by changing the outcome of particular
branches. Second, it thoroughly checks program operations such as memory accesses and
assertions, in order to find errors. The heuristics based on program analysis complement
symbolic execution by partly mitigating its scalability problems and steering it actively
towards the target.
To scale this process to multiple systems and hundreds or thousands of patches, we have
also built an infrastructure which executes automatically, as appropriate, each of the
previous steps, requiring no changes to the systems under test nor to their regression
suites (§4.3).
4.2 KATCH
This section describes in more detail the katch patch testing infrastructure: patch
preprocessing (§4.2.1), input selection with weakest preconditions (§4.2.2), greedy explo-
ration with informed path regeneration (§4.2.3) and definition switching (§4.2.4).
4.2.1 Patch Preprocessing
The first stage of our analysis is mainly responsible for retrieving each program version
from the version control system, determining the differences from the previous version—
i.e. the patch—and breaking this patch into lines which are then handled individually
by the subsequent steps. In addition, the lines are filtered and consolidated when
appropriate, as described next.
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Index: src/mod_accesslog.c
------------------------
---src/mod_accesslog.c  (revision 2659)
+++src/mod_accesslog.c  (revision 2660)
@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@
void log(char input) {
  int file = open("access.log", ...);
+ if (input >= ' ' &&
+     input <= '~') {
    // printable characters
    write(file, &input, 1);
+ } else {
+   char* escinput;
+   escinput = escape(input);
+   write(file, escinput, 2);
+ }
  close(file);
}
(a)
Index: src/mod_accesslog.c
------------------------
---src/mod_accesslog.c  (revision 2659)
+++src/mod_accesslog.c  (revision 2660)
@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@
void log(char input) {
  int file = open("access.log", ...);
+ if (input >= ' ' &&
+     input <= '~') {
    // printable characters
    write(file, &input, 1);
+ } else {
+   char* escinput;
+   escinput = escape(input);
+   write(file, escinput, 2);
+ }
  close(file);
}
(b)
Index: src/mod_accesslog.c
------------------------
---src/mod_accesslog.c  (revision 2659)
+++src/mod_accesslog.c  (revision 2660)
@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@
void log(char input) {
  int file = open("access.log", ...);
+ if (input >= ' ' &&
+     input <= '~') {
    // printable characters
    write(file, &input, 1);
+ } else {
+   char* escinput;
+   escinput = escape(input);
+   write(file, escinput, 2);
+ }
  close(file);
}
(c)
Index: src/mod_accesslog.c
------------------------
---src/mod_accesslog.c  (revision 2659)
+++src/mod_accesslog.c  (revision 2660)
@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@
void log(char input) {
  int file = open("access.log", ...);
+ if (input >= ' ' &&
+     input <= '~') {
    // printable characters
    write(file, &input, 1);
+ } else {
+   char* escinput;
+   escinput = escape(input);
+   write(file, escinput, 2);
+ }
  close(file);
}
TARGET 1
(d)
Figure 4.2: Execution of the patch preprocessing steps on an example patch adapted
from the lighttpd web server. (a) patch in diff format obtained from the version
control system, (b) removal of non-executable lines of code, (c) removal of lines already
executed by the regression tests, and (d) grouping of uncovered lines from the same basic
block into a single target.
Figure 4.2 shows the preprocessing steps that each patch goes through. While each line
in a patch is a potential target to katch, in practice, many lines do not need to be
considered. First, source code contains many non-executable lines, such as declarations,
comments, blank lines, or lines not compiled into the executable due to conditional
compilation directives (Figure 4.2(b)). Second, we are not interested in lines already
covered by the system’s regression test suite (Figure 4.2(c)). Finally, lines which are
part of the same basic block are always going to be executed together, so we only need
to keep one representative per basic block (Figure 4.2(d)).
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The patch preprocessing stage is responsible for eliminating all these lines and works in
two steps: a first step performs a simple static pass to eliminate non-executable code
and all but one line in each basic block, and a second step runs the program’s regression
suite to eliminate lines already covered by its test cases.
This results in a set of lines which are on the one hand executable and on the other hand
are not executed by the program’s test suite—which we call targets. Each of them is
processed individually in the following stages.
4.2.2 Seed Selection With Weakest Preconditions
Our input synthesis technique starts from an existing program input—called the seed—
extracted from the program’s test suite, and iteratively changes it. The ideal seed
executes code which is close to the target, in order to allow katch to quickly steer
execution by switching only a few branch outcomes to reach the target.
To estimate the distance between the path executed by a seed and the target, we
calculate the (static) minimum distance in the program’s interprocedural control flow
graph (iCFG) between each basic block exercised by the seed and the target basic
block. The minimum of these distances represents the distance from the seed to the
target. Intuitively, the effort of symbolic execution lies in switching the outcome of
branch statements, therefore we compute this distance in terms of the number of branch
statements between the two basic blocks.
We also simplify the minimum distance computation by not requiring it to be context-
sensitive. To do this, we note that pairs of matched function calls and returns should
not contribute to the distance between two basic blocks. In practice, this means that we
can “shortcut” function calls, i.e. each function call introduces an edge to the instruction
immediately following the call, in addition to the edge to the target function. In turn,
shortcutting function calls allows us to remove all return edges, simplifying the analysis.
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1 if (input < 100)
2 f(0);
3
4 if (input > 100)
5 if (input > 200)
6 f(input)
7
8 void f(int x) {
9 if (x == 999)
10 // target
11 }
C−flow
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Figure 4.3: Code snippet with instructions annotated with the minimum distance to
the target, computed using only control-flow analysis (C-flow column) and control-
flow analysis combined with our weakest precondition variant (WP column). The
interprocedural control-flow graph associated with the code is provided for clarity. The
nodes are labelled with the line number they correspond to, function calls are represented
by dashed arrows and intraprocedural control transfer by solid arrows.
However, the estimated distance outlined so far—which we call C-flow distance, as it
only takes the control flow into account—can select inputs which exercise paths close to
a target, but cannot be easily changed to actually reach the target. In the interest of
simplicity, we show a contrived example in Figure 4.3 to illustrate such a scenario. The
code snippet takes a single integer as input and uses it to decide whether to call function
f, which contains the target. The only input which exercises the target is 999. The
figure also shows the C-flow distance from each instruction to the target. For example,
the C-flow distance for the instruction at line 5 is 2, because the shortest path to the
target traverses two branches (on lines 5 and 9).
For simplicity, assume that we only want to assess whether input 50 is better than input
150. From a pure control-flow perspective, 50 appears to be a better choice because it
exercises function f and reaches the if condition guarding the target (while 150 does not
call f at all). Upon closer inspection however, it is clear that the target guard condition
x == 999 is always false on this path because function f is called with argument 0 on
line 2, and therefore the target cannot get executed through this call. This observation
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led us to create a technique which automatically prunes control flow graph edges which
provably do not lead to the target.
To find such edges we use an interprocedural data-flow analysis which computes for each
target and basic block in the program a necessary condition to reach that target, a form
of weakest precondition (§2.3). If by traversing an edge we obtain a false condition,
we conclude that the target is unreachable through that edge. Considering the same
example, the branch on line 9, which guards the target, creates the condition x = 999,
while the edge from the function call at line 2 defines x to be 0. By simple syntactic
substitution, we obtain the formula 0 = 999 which evaluates to false, and conclude that
the function call on line 2 cannot help in reaching the target. Column WP of Figure 4.3
shows the minimum distance from each instruction to the target after removing the edge
introduced by this function call. Lines 1 and 2 have their distances updated.
For the interested reader, we present the data-flow equations which compute the pre-
conditions, relative to a target, at the beginning and at the end of each basic block, and
give an intuition on their correctness.
(1) outb =
∨
s∈succb(condb→s ∧ ins)
(2) inb = wp(b, outb)
With initial values:
intarget = true, outtarget = false
inb = outb = false,∀b 6= target
condb→s represents the condition required to go from basic block b to s. For unconditional
branches the condition is always true. wp(b, outb) is the standard weakest precondition
function (§2.3), applied to basic block b and postcondition outb, which is easily computed
for a single basic block as we describe below.
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The equations guarantee that any edge b→ s for which condb→s ∧ ins is false and any
basic block b for which inb is false cannot lead to the target.
The first equation intuitively says that at the end of a basic block b, the condition to
reach the target is the disjunction of the conditions for all possible paths from that
basic block to the target. The second equation obtains the weakest precondition for a
basic block from its corresponding postcondition. This is done by iterating through the
instructions of the basic block in reverse order and substituting all variables from the
postcondition with their definition, as appropriate. A variable not defined in the current
basic block is left unchanged. When applied to the target basic block, the wp function
always yields true.
Solving the system is done using a standard fixed-point computation approach. Our
implementation makes two conservative approximations to make the analysis tractable
even on large programs. First, the wp function only handles assignments which do not
involve function calls. If the basic block applies other operations to the postcondition
variables, the returned value is true. Second, a disjunction of syntactically non-identical
formulae in the first equation is also treated as true, to prevent formulae from growing
exponentially.
These two approximations capture two common practical cases. First, formulae which
become false when applying the wp function usually correspond to code patterns which
use boolean flags or enumerated type variables in branch conditions; basic blocks which,
for example, set a flag to false and make a certain branch infeasible are recognised
accordingly. The example in Figure 4.3 is such a case.
Second, formulae may become false because the set of conjuncts accumulated through
the first data-flow equation becomes inconsistent. This case corresponds to patterns
where the same variables are used in branch conditions multiple times, possibly in
different parts of the program and some of the conditions are mutually incompatible.
A simple example can be observed in Figure 4.3: the weakest precondition algorithm
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Figure 4.4: Execution of weakest preconditions-enabled minimum distance computation
for input 50 on the code in Figure 4.3. (a) emphasises the lines executed by the
input, (b) removes the function call edge from line 2, (c) removes orphaned node 9,
and (d) selects node 4 which is the closest to the target, at distance 3.
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Figure 4.5: Execution of weakest preconditions-enabled minimum distance computation
for input 150 on the code in Figure 4.3. (a) emphasises the lines executed by the input,
(b) removes the function call edge from line 2, (c) makes no changes as no nodes were
orphaned, and (d) selects node 5 which is the closest to the target, at distance 2.
can prove that the branch between lines 1 → 2 does not to lead to the target because
the branch condition input < 100 is incompatible with the condition input > 100 which
appears subsequently on the only path to the target.
After obtaining the branches and basic blocks that cannot lead to the target, and the
distance from each basic block to the target, the distance from each available seed input
to the target is computed as follows:
1. Compute the subgraph G of the program’s iCFG by running the program on the
seed input. G’s nodes are the basic blocks executed and its edges are the branches
taken and function calls made during execution;
2. Remove all nodes and edges in G which were proven to make the target unreachable;
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3. Iteratively remove from G all nodes orphaned by the previous step, i.e. while there
are nodes with in-degree 0 (except the program entry point), remove them and all
their outgoing edges;
4. Choose the minimum from the distances of the remaining nodes to the target.
Step 3 is a dynamic refinement of the previous data-flow analysis. Informally, it propa-
gates the infeasible property to all basic blocks which the input exercises only through
infeasible basic blocks or branches, thus obtaining a more accurate estimate for the length
of the shortest feasible path to the target.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show graphically the execution of the four steps on the code previously
presented in Figure 4.3. It can be seen that input 50 is farther from the target than input
150.
4.2.3 Greedy Exploration with Informed Path Regeneration
The last and most challenging stage of katch is responsible for transforming the pre-
viously selected seed input into a new input that executes the target. Our approach is
based on symbolic execution (§2.1), a program analysis technique that can systemati-
cally explore paths through a program. To recapitulate, the key idea behind symbolic
execution is to run the program on symbolic input, which is initially allowed to have any
value. Then, whenever a branch depending directly or indirectly on the symbolic input
is encountered, execution is conceptually forked to follow both sides if both are feasible,
adding appropriate constraints on each side of the branch. Finally, whenever a path
terminates or hits an error, the constraints gathered on that path are solved to produce
a concrete input that exercises the path. For example, if we run the code in Figure 4.3
treating the input variable as symbolic, then at branch 1 execution will be split into
two paths: one following the then side of the branch, on which we add the constraint
that input < 100, and one following the implicit else side of the branch, on which we
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add the constraint that input ≥ 100. When the path with the constraint input < 100
reaches line 4, only the else side is feasible, so no other path is spawned at this point.
On the other hand, when the path with the constraint input ≥ 100 reaches line 4 both
sides are feasible, so execution is again split into two paths, one on which we add the
constraint that input > 100, and one on which we add the constraint that input ≤ 100
(which together with the existing constraint that input ≥ 100 gets simplified to input =
100). The branches at lines 5 and 9 similarly spawn new execution paths. Finally, when
a path terminates, a constraint solver is used to generate a solution to all the constraints
gathered on that path, which represents an input that can be used to exercise the path.
For example, the path with the constraints input ≥ 100, input > 100 and input ≤ 200
may return the solution input = 150 which exercises that path.
In our approach, we start symbolic execution from an existing input, the seed, similarly
to the approach taken in concolic execution (§2.1) and our zesti system (Chapter 5).
The seed is then iteratively modified by exploring paths which get closer to the target;
symbolic execution provides the framework for the exploration and constraint solving is
used to map program paths back to inputs. The novelty of our approach lies in the way
paths are selected for exploration.
The selection is based on a metric which estimates the distance from a path to the target,
similar to the distance used by the input selection stage (§4.2.2). In each iteration, we
execute the program using the latest input, and remember all branch points, e.g. if
conditions, along with information necessary to continue execution on the other side of
the branch, should we later decide to.
We then select the branch point whose unexplored side S is closest to the target (ac-
cording to the estimated distance) and attempt to explore this side. If S is feasible, i.e.
the conjunction of the branch condition towards S and the current path condition is
satisfiable, we eagerly explore it, in what we call a greedy exploration step. Otherwise,
we examine two possibilities: (1) the branch condition is symbolic, i.e. it has a data
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1 void log(char input) {
2 int file = open("access.log", O WRONLY|O APPEND);
3 if (input >= ’ ’ && input <= ’~’) {
4 write(file, &input, 1);
5 } else {
6 char escinput = escape(input);
7 write(file, &escinput, 1);
8 }
9 close(file);
10 }
Figure 4.6: Example based on lighttpd patch 2660 used to illustrate the greedy
exploration step. Lines 3, 5–8 represent the patch.
dependence on program input on the current path and (2) the branch condition is
concrete, i.e. it has a control dependence on program input. Informally, a branch
condition is data dependent on program input if data propagates from the input to at
least one of the variables involved in the branch condition via a sequence of assignments.
A condition is control dependent on the input if at least one variable involved in the
condition has more than one reaching definition. Note that some conditions can be both
data and control dependent.
For data dependent conditions (including those which are also control dependent), we
apply informed path regeneration, where we travel back to the branch point that made S
infeasible and take there the other side of the branch. For control dependent conditions,
we attempt to find a different definition for the variables involved in the condition, such
that the condition becomes true. In the following, we examine each of these cases in
detail.
To illustrate our approach, we use the code snippet in Figure 4.6, which is based on a
patch introduced in revision 2660 of the lighttpd web server. The log function takes a
single character as input and writes it into a text file. The function was initially writing
all characters unmodified, but was patched in order to escape sensitive characters that
could corrupt the file structure. However, the program was tested only with printable
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1 if (0 == strcmp(requestVerb, "GET")) { ... }
. . .
2 for (char∗ p = requestVerb; ∗p; p++) {
3 log(∗p);
Figure 4.7: Example based on lighttpd patch 2660 used to illustrate the informed path
regeneration step. As in Figure 4.6, the patch is on lines 3, 5–8 of the log function.
character inputs and thus the else branch was never executed. After seeding the analysis
with such an input containing only printable characters, our technique determines that
the else side of the symbolic branch point at line 3 is the unexplored branch side closest
to the patch (in fact, it is part of the patch), and goes on to explore it (in a greedy
exploration step) by negating the condition on line 3.
To understand when informed path regeneration is necessary, consider the example
in Figure 4.7, in which the log function of Figure 4.6 is called for each character of
the requestVerb string. Assuming that the seed request contains the GET verb, the
comparison at line 1 constrains this input to the value GET for the remainder of the
execution. Changing any of the characters in the requestVerb is impossible after this
point because it would create an inconsistent execution, and thus on this path we cannot
follow the else side of the branch in the log function.
Instead, our informed path regeneration step travels back just before the execution of the
symbolic branch point that introduced the constraint that makes the patch unreachable,
and then explores the other side of that branch point. In our example, that symbolic
branch point is the one at which requestVerb[2] was constrained to be ‘T’, and thus our
technique takes here the other side of the branch, in which requestVerb[2] is constrained
to be different from ‘T’. With this updated path condition, execution reaches again line 3
of the log function, where execution is allowed to take the else path and thus cover the
patch.
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src/io.c
217 enum DIFF wh sp ig white space = ignore white space;
...
230 switch (ig white space)
231 {
232 case IGNORE_ALL_SPACE:
233 while ((c = ∗p++) != ’\n’)
234 if (! isspace (c))
235 h = HASH (h, ig case ? tolower (c) : c);
236 break;
src/diff.c
291 while ((c = getopt long (argc, argv,
shortopts, longopts, NULL)) != −1)
292 {
293 switch (c)
294 {
...
319 case ’b’:
320 if (ignore white space < IGNORE_SPACE_CHANGE)
321 ignore white space = IGNORE_SPACE_CHANGE;
322 break;
323
324 case ’Z’:
325 if (ignore white space < IGNORE_SPACE_CHANGE)
326 ignore white space |= IGNORE_TRAILING_SPACE;
...
389 case ’E’:
390 if (ignore white space < IGNORE_SPACE_CHANGE)
391 ignore white space |= IGNORE_TAB_EXPANSION;
392 break;
...
494 case ’w’:
495 ignore white space = IGNORE_ALL_SPACE;
496 break;
Figure 4.8: Example from diffutils revision 8739d45f showcasing the need for definition
switching. The patch is on line 235 and is guarded by a condition that is control
dependent on the input.
4.2.4 Definition Switching
Informed path regeneration does not work if the branch condition has a concrete value,
essentially because we cannot reason symbolically about concrete expressions. This
68
case occurs when the condition does not have a data dependence on the input on the
currently explored path, but only a control dependence. Figure 4.8, containing code from
diffutils revision 8739d45f, showcases such a scenario. The revision modifies line 235,
which is our target.
To execute the patch, one needs to pass through the switch statement on line 230, requir-
ing ig white space, and in turn ignore white space to be equal to the IGNORE ALL SPACE
constant. This only happens when the program is given the -w command line argument
(line 495). Assuming the current input does not include -w, the lack of a data dependence
between the switch condition and the command line arguments renders informed path
regeneration unusable. To solve this problem, we use a lightweight approach that finds
the reaching definitions for the variables involved in the condition using static analysis
and then attempts to find a path to an uncovered definition using the two techniques
previously presented. To further improve the chances of getting the right definition early,
the algorithm gives priority to definitions that can be statically shown to satisfy the
target branch condition. Furthermore, the algorithm works recursively on all definitions
which were already executed, but for which the right-hand side is not a constant. That
is, the algorithm can be nested multiple times by using a stack of intermediary targets;
when a definition needs to be switched, the active target is saved on the stack and the
selected definition becomes the new active target. As soon as the definition is executed,
the previous target is popped off the stack.
To show how definition switching works in practice, consider the same code snippet
and the input -a -y -- a b provided by input selection, which compares two files a
and b treating them as text (-a), and outputs the results side-by-side (-y). This input
reaches the guarding switch statement on line 230 but evaluates to a different case. To
reach the target, we need to modify the input such that the condition ig white space ==
IGNORE ALL SPACE is satisfied. Because the condition does not have a data dependence
on the input, katch attempts to find another definition for the ig white space local
variable and discovers one on line 217. However, it detects that this definition was
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REPO="git://git.savannah.gnu.org/diffutils.git"
DIFFTARGETS="src lib"
PROGRAMS="src/diff src/diff3 src/sdiff src/cmp"
LIBS="-lrt"
Figure 4.9: Configuration file used to test diffutils. The file specifies the repository
address, the folders which may contain relevant changes, the programs to test and the
libraries required to build the system.
already executed, so it recursively attempts to find definitions for the right-hand side of
the assignment, the ignore white space global variable.
At this point, katch finds four definitions, each corresponding to a different command
line argument and decides to use ignore white space = IGNORE ALL SPACE because it
matches exactly the original condition which it attempts to satisfy. katch now pushes
the original target (line 235) to the stack and changes the active target to line 495. It then
uses an informed path regeneration step to replace the first command line argument with
the required -w option. This reaches the intermediary target which causes the original
target to be popped off the target stack and transformed back into the active target.
Execution continues and this time the ignore white space and ig white space variables
have the appropriate values to reach the patch. The synthesised input which reaches the
patch is -w -y -- a b.
4.3 Implementation
katch consists of patch preprocessing scripts, the input selection subsystem, the aug-
mented symbolic execution tool and a set of scripts which automatically iterate through
all patches in a given set of program revisions. Most components operate at the level of
llvm bitcode, the intermediate language used by the popular llvm compiler [56].
At a high level, a tester is only required to create a configuration file with details
about the system to test, such as the repository address and the names of targeted
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executable files. Figure 4.9 shows the actual file used for testing diffutils. Optionally,
the tester can also provide scripts for compiling the system and running its regression
suite. Otherwise, the default configure, make and make check commands are used,
adapted for creating llvm bitcode along with the native executables. Having this setup,
the tester only needs to issue a command such as:
$ katch diffutils rev1 rev2
to test all diffutils revisions between rev1 and rev2. This script could be easily added
to a continuous integration system to automatically test the last patch.
4.3.1 Patch Preprocessing
Patch preprocessing is implemented via two llvm passes: the first one statically prunes
non-executable lines by traversing the compiled program and using debug information
to map llvm instructions back to source code; a line is deemed non-executable if no
instruction maps back to it. The second pass instruments the program to obtain test
suite coverage information and determine which patch lines are executed by the test
suite.
4.3.2 Input Selection
Input selection uses a combination of scripts and llvm passes to instrument the program
and analyse the execution of its test suite. In this phase, the original executables specified
in the configuration file are replaced with wrapper scripts that invoke an instrumented
copy of the corresponding binary. For each target, the instrumentation computes and
outputs to a file the minimum distance from each test suite input, allowing the wrapper
to determine which input gets closest to the target. This input is identified transparently
by its sequence number, i.e. the number of times the program was executed by the test
71
suite so far. Subsequently, we run the test suite again and when reaching the target
sequence number, we invoke katch instead of the regular executable.
The only assumption made by our approach is that the order of running the tests is
deterministic, which holds in all cases we have looked at. While we could have used
other solutions, we found that they are either not as general or they do not perform as
well. For example, a different solution would be to record the program arguments used
to get to the minimum distance instead of the sequence number and then run katch
directly using these arguments. However, this approach fails when the test suite harness
creates any non-trivial setup, not captured by the command line arguments, such as
files, pipes or environment variables. Another approach is to directly run the symbolic
execution component of katch on all test inputs. The downside is the larger overhead:
symbolically interpreting the program is several orders of magnitude slower than native
execution, while the instrumented programs have a comparable execution time to their
native counterparts.
Instrumenting the program is performed through an llvm pass which takes as input
the original program and the current target. The pass uses a standard shortest path
algorithm to statically compute the distance from each basic block to the target in the
program’s interprocedural control flow graph and adds instrumentation to record which
basic blocks are executed, to finally determine the executed basic block at the minimum
distance from the target. It further uses the weakest precondition data-flow analysis
described in §4.2.2 to refine this distance and inserts code in the executable to eliminate
from the computation those branches which provably cannot lead to the target. To
increase maintainability, most of the instrumentation is written in C++ as a set of helper
functions which are then statically linked with the target program.
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4.3.3 Symbolic Exploration
katch is implemented on top of the klee [16] open-source symbolic execution engine.
katch starts by executing the program using the selected seed input to completion or
until a predefined timeout expires. On this path it records all the branches that the
program does not take. This includes branches whose associated branch condition is
symbolic and feasible (i.e. has a data dependency on the program input and an input
exists which executes the branch and the same path before it), symbolic and infeasible
(has a data dependency on the program input but no input exists which executes the
branch and the same path before it), and concrete (does not have a data dependency
on the input). This provides more information for selecting the next path, as opposed
to previous approaches which only considered the branches that depend on the symbolic
input. The branches are then considered in order of increasing distance to the target as
candidates for one of the techniques employed by katch: greedy exploration for feasible
branches, and informed path regeneration or definition switching for infeasible branches.
Once a suitable branch is found, the process repeats, executing a batch of instructions
and re-evaluating the available paths.
We decided to use a batch of instructions, instead of a single one because this offers
the advantage of generating more paths to choose from at the next iteration, with only
a small time penalty, effectively providing a form of look-ahead. In certain scenarios,
this compensates for the underestimation of the distance between two instructions, by
permitting the execution of longer paths than dictated by the static estimation. Re-
evaluating the available paths after each instruction is also possible but has an increased
overhead and is more likely to get stuck in local optima. Our implementation currently
uses batches of 10,000 LLVM instructions.
katch uses another optimisation to handle efficiently several common functions whose
use is expensive in a symbolic execution context: the getopt family of functions, and
strcmp. The getopt functions are helpers used by many programs to process command
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line arguments. They work by allowing the programmer to write a simple specification
of the arguments accepted by the program, thus moving the bulk of the command line
parsing code inside the library functions. katch is aware of the getopt semantics
and uses this information to speed up processing. More precisely, whenever the return
value of getopt is a reaching definition, instead of recursively descending in the function
code, it inspects the function argument corresponding to the specification of accepted
command line arguments and directly determines the command line option needed to
obtain the desired definition. The new argument is added to the command line and
program execution restarts from the beginning.
The strcmp family of functions compares lexicographically two strings and returns -1,
0 or 1, depending on their ordering. These functions are often used to examine input
and execute parts of the program logic if the input equals a certain predefined string.
Virtually all strcmp implementations compare their arguments element-by-element, and
return as soon as a mismatch is found. While this is desirable for efficiency reasons,
the constraints thus generated only offer katch information on the first character that
does not match. Should katch decide that the best path towards the target needs
to satisfy the string equality, it would have to go through multiple iterations to make
the strings equal, modifying a single character at a time. This has an adverse impact
on performance, but even worse, some of the intermediate strings may not be valid
inputs, which can cause execution to diverge from the original path in an informed
path regeneration step. Our implementation solves this problem using a strcmp model
whose return value is a conjunction of equalities, one for each position in its input strings,
rather than just the first mismatch. Even though this model can only indicate equality or
inequality, but not ordering, we found it sufficient for all the programs in our evaluation.
Figure 4.10 shows an example where katch uses the strcmp model. Reaching the patch
requires that the name of one of the files passed on the command line is - (single dash),
which is interpreted as standard input. The input selected from the test suite is in-4067
in2-4067, while an input which would exercise the patch is - in2-4067. katch correctly
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src/diff.c
1086 else if (strcmp (cmp.file[f].name, "-"))
1087 {
1088 cmp.file[f].desc = STDIN FILENO;
1089 if (binary && ! isatty (STDIN FILENO))
1090 xfreopen (NULL, "rb", stdin);
Figure 4.10: Example from diffutils revision cd10d2c3 (edited for clarity) where the
strcmp model is used to avoid divergence after an informed path regeneration step.
Line 1090 contains the patch.
detects that to reach the patch, the condition on line 1086 should be true, which without
a strcmp model, means that the first character of the file name should be -. To make
this change, it needs to apply an informed path regeneration step as we described in
Section §4.2.3, thus going back just before the command line processing code inspected
the argument. At that point, the input will be transformed into -n-4067 in2-4067. Note
in particular, that the first argument is now invalid: diff interprets the leading dash
followed by more characters as a program option. Because no such option exists, the
program exits with an error messages instead of following the original path to the target.
The strcmp model solves this problem by adding an additional constraint forcing the
second character in the file name to equal the terminating NUL, thus directly creating the
desired input - in2-4067.
4.3.4 Limitations
We discuss below the most significant limitations of our current prototype. Most im-
portantly, we currently do not handle targets which are accessible only through function
pointer calls that have not been exercised by the regression suite. Such indirect calls
pose problems both during the static analysis when computing the closest input, and
during dynamic exploration. The problems could be mitigated by including support for
pointer analysis [1, Chapter 12] which katch currently does not offer.
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Table 4.1: Application suites used to evaluate katch along with the number of programs
in each of them, the number of patches inspected and the timespan in months.
System Programs Size (ELOC) Patches Timespan (mo)
findutils 3 14,939 125 26
diffutils 4 42,930 175 30
binutils 12 68,830 181 16
Second, our current implementation of definition switching does not support aggregate
data types such as structures and arrays and cannot be applied to branch conditions
which include variables of these types. Finally, klee’s environment model is incomplete,
e.g. it does not handle certain system calls.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
For an objective evaluation of our technique, we have set ourselves the following two
requirements. First, we have decided to do no cherry picking: once we have chosen a
set of benchmark programs, rather than selecting the 10 (or 20, or 30) patches on which
our technique works well, we included all the patches written over an extended period
of time. Second, we have decided to allow a short timeout for our system, of no more
than 15 minutes, which we believe is representative for the amount of time that can be
dedicated in an automatic, possibly overnight, testing system.
We evaluated katch on nineteen programs from the GNU diffutils, GNU binutils and
GNU findutils application suites, summarized in Table 4.1. These are all mature and
widely used programs, installed on virtually all UNIX-based distributions.
GNU findutils is a collection of three programs, find, xargs and locate. They are
smaller in size than the other two benchmarks, having a combined 14,939 executable lines
of code (ELOC)2 in the tools themselves, and include additional portions of code from
2We report the number of ELOC in the latest version tested, measured using cloc (http://cloc.
sourceforge.net).
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gnulib, which totals more than 280,000 ELOC at the latest revision that we inspected.
We examined the 125 patches written in the two years and two months period between
November 2010 and January 2013.
GNU diffutils comprises four programs, diff, sdiff, diff3 and cmp. They are of
medium size, with 42,930 ELOC in the tools themselves, and include additional portions
of code from gnulib, similarly to findutils. We have analysed all the 175 patches
written during the 2.5 years between November 2009 and May 2012.
GNU binutils includes a variety of programs out of which, due to time constraints,
we selected the twelve assorted binary utilities from the binutils folder (addr2line,
ar, cxxfilt, elfedit, nm, objcopy, objdump, ranlib, readelf, size, strings and strip).
They contain 68,830 ELOC, and use the statically linked libraries libbfd, libopcodes and
libiberty, which total over 800,000 ELOC. Because of the more accelerated development
pace in binutils, we examined a shorter 1 year 4 months period between April 2011 and
August 2012, in which 181 patches were added to the binutils directory.
We set a short timeout of ten minutes per target for findutils and diffutils and
a timeout of fifteen minutes for the larger binutils programs. We used a four-core
Intel Xeon E3-1280 machine with 16 GB of RAM, running a 64-bit Fedora 16 system.
As an extra safety check, we verified that all inputs generated by katch execute the
corresponding patch code on the natively compiled programs, using gcov for coverage
measurement.
Our tool and results3 have been successfully evaluated by the ESEC/FSE 2013 artifact
evaluation committee and obtained a Distinguished Artifact award.
4.4.1 Coverage Improvement
As a first measure of katch’s effectiveness, we looked at its ability to improve patch
coverage. Because katch operates at the basic block level, we define patch coverage as
3http://srg.doc.ic.ac.uk/projects/katch/preview.html
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Figure 4.11: Distribution of minimum distances for the 939 targets not covered by the
regression suites. The figure does not include 389 binutils targets accessible only
through indirect function calls not exercised by the test suite, which are outside the
current capabilities of katch. Each bar also shows the fraction of targets covered by
katch for each distance.
the number of executed basic blocks which contain statements added or modified by a
patch over the total number of basic blocks which contain such statements.
The patches analysed contain altogether 9,873 textual lines of code.4 After processing
these lines to remove non-executable statements and group related executable lines, we
obtained 1,362 potential targets which are part of 122 patches. Upon manual inspection,
we found that the rest of the patches only keep the build system up-to-date with the
program dependencies, or make changes to the documentation or test suite. A total
of 423 targets were already covered by the system’s test suite, leaving 939 targets for
katch to analyse.
4This includes only lines in .c and .h files.
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Table 4.2: Number of targets covered by the manual test suite, and the manual test suite
plus katch.
Program Targets Covered
Suite Test Test + katch
findutils 344 215 (63%) 300 (87%)
diffutils 166 58 (35%) 121 (73%)
binutils 852 150 (18%) 285 (33%)
Total 1,362 423 (31%) 706 (52%)
The first step performed by katch is to compute the minimum distance from the re-
gression test inputs to each target. Figure 4.11 presents the distribution of the minimum
distances, which also provides a rough estimate of the work that katch needs to do for
each target. More than half of the targets have regression tests which get relatively close
to the target, at a distance smaller than five. Just a small fraction of the targets are at a
distance over 20, which are all contained in completely untested binutils features. The
figure does not include 389 binutils targets accessible only through indirect function
calls not exercised by the test suite, which are outside the current capabilities of katch.
Table 4.2 summarises the results obtained after applying katch to these 939 targets. The
Targets column lists the total number of targets for each benchmark and the Covered
column lists the number of targets covered by the regression test suite, respectively
the regression test suite and katch. It can be seen that katch has automatically
increased the findutils patch coverage from 63% to 87%, it more than doubled the
diffutils patch coverage, and made a more modest improvement for binutils, while
still discovering fourteen bugs (§4.4.2). Overall, the patch coverage was increased from
31% to 52% (covering 283 out of the 939 targets).
We analyse below the cases in which katch fails to reach the target, in order to illustrate
its limitations. More than half of the cases are targets accessible only through indirect
function calls never exercised by the test suite, which our current prototype does not
handle (see §4.3.4).
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Another large number of cases relate to complex or multiple guard conditions. To satisfy
them, katch would need to alter the input structure or to have access to a richer test
suite, containing different seed inputs. For example, many binutils targets are only
executed when the input file contains specific sections, with an individually defined
structure. When none of the test suite files contains such a section type, the targets are
usually not covered because katch cannot synthesise a complete section from scratch
in the allotted time.
A more subtle scenario involves data stored using variable-length encoding, which is
often used by binutils. In this case, katch can easily change input values only as long
as they would be encoded using the same length. Changing to a value with a different
encoding length would require inserting or removing one or more bytes in the middle
of the input, significantly increasing complexity by possibly affecting other parts of the
input such as header offsets.
Therefore, katch works best when the seed input does not need to have its structure
altered. This is an inherent limitation of symbolic execution, which does not treat the
input structure (e.g. its size) symbolically. This limitation is mitigated as the test suite
quality improves and the chances of finding a good seed input increase.
The fact that our definition switching analysis does not support aggregate data types
(§4.3.4) also affects several targets. A smaller number of targets cannot be reached due
to the incomplete environment model implemented in klee, such as unsupported system
calls.
Finally, we also noticed that several targets were not covered because they correspond
to unreachable code on our test system—e.g. are reachable only on operating systems
which differentiate between text and binary files.
In addition to the overall coverage improvement, we also wanted to measure exactly the
contribution of each heuristic used by katch. We therefore re-executed the same experi-
ments, selectively disabling all possible combinations of heuristics (note that all heuristics
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Table 4.3: Number of targets covered by different combinations of heuristics: greedy
(G), greedy and informed path regeneration (G+IPR), greedy and definition switching
(G+DS) and all (katch).
Program G G + IPR G + DS KATCH
Suite
findutils 74 85 78 85
diffutils 25 29 49 63
binutils 70 121 76 135
Total 169 235 203 283
depend on greedy). Table 4.3 shows the results. It can be seen that the improvement
brought by each heuristic varies from system to system. At one end of the spectrum
diffutils covers 152% more targets when using all heuristics compared to greedy alone,
while at the other end findutils sees only a 15% improvement. Overall, informed path
regeneration and definition switching combined brought a 67% improvement.
We have also run our experiments using klee instead of katch, to see how well a pure
dynamic symbolic execution approach performs. We ran klee for 30 minutes on each
revision, and we used an appropriate set of symbolic arguments. The results were very
poor, with only two targets covered in the smaller findutils programs.
4.4.2 Bugs Found
katch was also able to identify a total of fifteen distinct crash bugs. We could verify
that thirteen of these are also present in the latest version and we reported them to
the developers, providing automatically-generated inputs which trigger them. Eleven of
the bugs were discovered as a direct consequence of katch’s goal to reach the target:
six bugs are in the actual targets and are discovered as they are introduced, while the
other five are discovered because a patch is applied in their vicinity. Reaching this patch
then leads to the discovery of the fault as katch continues executing the program to
completion.
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One bug was found in findutils, and the rest were found in binutils, the largest and
most complex of all three application suites. A manual analysis of the bugs revealed
that they relate to the handling of unexpected inputs. Interestingly, binutils generally
does a good job handling such situations, but in several cases, the checks performed
are incomplete. An example is bug 152065 in objdump, a buffer overflow caused by
improperly checked buffer bounds. The bug appears in revision 119e7b90, shown in part
in Figure 4.12. Line 251 reads the buffer size from the buffer itself and lines 391 and 392
rely on this size to iterate through the entire buffer. The overflow occurs if the size read
does not match the allocated buffer size.
Another example is the readelf bug 15191,6 shown in Figure 4.13. This bug was detected
in revision b895e9d, when code was added to conditionally execute several existing lines.
None of the code shown was executed by the regression tests. Line 12238 was newly
added, therefore katch used it as a target and eventually executed it. It then attempted
to run the program until the end and reached the next line (12240) where it discovered
an overflow when reading through the external pointer. We have not debugged the
exact root cause of the bug ourselves, but we sent an input triggering the crash to the
developers, who fixed it shortly.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We have presented katch, an automated technique for testing software patches. Our
approach relies on symbolic execution, augmented by several synergistic heuristics based
on static and dynamic program analysis. We have applied katch to all the patches
written for nineteen programs over a combined period of approximately six years, and
have shown that our technique can find bugs and significantly increase patch coverage
with only a few minutes per target.
5http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=15206
6http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=15191
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binutils/dwarf.c
243 process ext line op (unsigned char ∗data, int is stmt)
...
251 len = read leb128 (data, & bytes read, 0);
252 data += bytes read;
...
380 unsigned int rlen = len − bytes read − 1;
...
391 for (; rlen; rlen−−)
392 printf (" %02x", ∗data++);
Figure 4.12: Example showing a bug found by katch, introduced in binutils revision
119e7b90. The bug is triggered on line 392. The highlighted lines are part of the patch.
binutils/readelf.c
12232 while (external < (Elf External Note ∗) ((char ∗) pnotes + length))
12233 {
...
12238 if (!is ia64 vms ())
12239 {
12240 inote.type = BYTE GET (external−>type);
12241 inote.namesz = BYTE GET (external−>namesz);
Figure 4.13: Example showing a bug found by katch, introduced in binutils revision
b895e9d. The bug is triggered on line 12240. The highlighted line is part of the patch.
We have learned several lessons from this research. First, it has reminded us that achiev-
ing high patch coverage is hard, and that as a result most patches remain untested—e.g.
for our benchmarks the manual patch coverage was a modest 31% overall.
Second, it has reinforced our belief that automatic techniques are able to increase patch
coverage and find bugs in the process. On average, katch was able to increase patch
coverage from 31% to 52%, while on the best performing benchmark (diffutils), it
more than doubled it, from 35% to 73%. In addition, we found fifteen crash bugs in
widely-used mature programs.
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Finally, it has shown us that the state of the art needs more advances to reach the goal
of fully automated testing of real patches: despite the increase in coverage and the bugs
found, katch was still unable to cover most of the targets in the binutils programs.
We hope our current results will act as a challenge to other researchers working in this
area.
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Chapter 5
zesti
5.1 Overview
katch leverages the regression test suite to generate new inputs that execute different
parts of the program under test. However, bugs that hide in covered code (§3.3.4),
are missed by this approach. We have created zesti to complement katch by target-
ing these bugs through symbolic execution along the program paths exercised by the
regression tests, allowing slight divergences around sensitive operations.
The main insight used by zesti is that regression test suites exercise interesting program
paths. Such test suites are often created by the programmers who wrote the application
and benefit from deep knowledge of the program logic, or by dedicated QA teams
which systematically evaluate the main program features and possible corner cases.
Furthermore, regression tests often cover program paths that previously triggered bugs,
which are more likely to contain further errors [64, 103]. For instance, while the visible
symptoms of the offending bugs are fixed, it can happen that the root cause of the bugs
is not; alternatively, slightly different executions could still trigger the same bug.
A common way to measure the quality of a test suite is code coverage. Testing method-
ologies often require creating test suites that achieve a certain level of line or branch
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coverage, and many projects contain relatively high-coverage test suites: for instance,
most applications that we analysed in Chapter 3 have manual test suites reaching over
60% line coverage.
Unfortunately, despite the effort invested in creating these manual regression suites, bugs
still remain undetected in the code covered by the test inputs. First of all, note that line
coverage can be misleading for quantifying the confidence in a system for two important
reasons. First, executing an operation may or may not cause a violation depending
on its arguments. For example accessing the i-th element of a vector is safe when i is
within vector bounds but causes an error otherwise. Line coverage, however, considers
the operation tested as soon as it is executed once. Second, code behaviour depends on
the path used to reach it; an instruction can operate correctly when reached along one
path but cause a violation along a slightly different path. These caveats also apply to
other coverage metrics, such as branch coverage.
In this chapter, we propose to augment regression suites by using symbolic execution to
(1) analyse instruction safety against all inputs that could exercise the instruction along
the same paths (§5.2.1) and (2) carefully choose and explore slightly divergent paths
from those executed by the regression suite (§5.2.2). Compared to standard regression
suites, our approach tests the program on all possible inputs on the paths exercised
by the regression suite and on a large number of neighbouring paths, without any
additional developer effort. Compared to standard symbolic execution, the approach
takes advantage of the effort spent creating these regression suites, to quickly guide
symbolic execution along paths that exercise interesting program behaviours.
5.2 Zero-Effort Symbolic Test Improvement
This section describes the two main techniques used by zesti: improving regression
suites with additional symbolic checks (§5.2.1), and exploring additional paths around
sensitive operations (§5.2.2).
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5.2.1 Thoroughly Testing Sensitive Operations
A standard regression test suite consists of multiple tests, each being an (input, expected
output) pair. The test harness iterates through the tests and runs for each of them the
target program with the given input and collects its output. zesti hooks into this process
by interposing between the testing script and the tested program, gaining complete
control over the system’s execution.
Similarly to [50], zesti replaces the program input with symbolic values and at the same
time remembers the concrete input, which is used to drive program execution whenever
a branch is encountered. While executing the program, path conditions are gathered and
used to verify potentially buggy operations. For example, whenever the program accesses
a symbolic memory location, zesti checks that the operation is safe for all inputs that
satisfy the current path condition.
Consider the snippet of code in Figure 5.1. Function f contains a bug: it accesses
an invalid memory location when passed a negative argument. A test suite might call
this function with different arguments and verify its behaviour, attempting to maximise
a certain metric, e.g., line coverage. It can be easily noticed that choosing one value
greater than 99 and one smaller than or equal to 99 exercises all instructions, branches
and paths without necessarily finding the bug. On the other hand, our approach finds
the bug whenever the function argument is smaller than 100: for such values, symbolic
execution gathers the path constraint x ≤ 99 on line 3, and then on line 5 checks whether
there are any values for x than can overflow the buffer v. More exactly, zesti checks
whether the formula x ≤ 99 ⇒ (x ≥ 0 ∧ x ≤ 99) is valid and immediately finds a
counterexample in the form of a negative integer assignment to x.
In order to be accepted by software developers, we strongly believe that zesti needs to
work transparently. We envision zesti being used in a similar way in which memory
debuggers such as Valgrind [66] or Purify [41] are employed today in conjunction with
test suites to provide stronger guarantees. For example, many open-source programs
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1 int v [ 1 0 0 ] ;
2 void f ( int x ) {
3 i f ( x > 99)
4 x = 99 ;
5 v [ x ] = 0 ;
6 }
Figure 5.1: Code snippet showcasing a bug missed by a test suite with 100% code
coverage, e.g. x=50, x=100.
provide a simple way to integrate Valgrind into their regression test frameworks, with
the user simply having to type “make test-valgrind” to execute the regression suite
under Valgrind. We hope zesti will be used in a similar way, by simply typing a
command like “make test-zesti”.
In other words, running an existing regression test suite under zesti should happen
without user intervention. To accommodate all testing frameworks, zesti treats both the
tests and the testing script as black boxes. It functions by renaming the original program
and replacing it with a script that invokes the zesti interpreter, passing as arguments
the original program and any command line arguments.1 zesti automatically detects
several input classes, namely command-line arguments and files opened for reading, and
treats them as sources of symbolic data. We found these two sources sufficient for our
benchmarks; however, adding additional input sources is relatively straightforward.
The main downside of this approach is execution overhead. In particular, there are two
main sources of overhead: first, the overhead of interpreting llvm code. Second, the
constraint solver overhead: however, note that unlike in regular symbolic execution, the
constraint solver is invoked in zesti only to check sensitive operations.
1Because zesti is an extension of the klee symbolic execution engine, which operates on LLVM
bitcode [56], users need to compile their code to LLVM in order to use zesti. However, this is not
a fundamental limitation of our approach, which could be integrated within a symbolic execution
framework that works directly on binaries.
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Inputs: MaxDist, the maximum distance to search,
S, the set of sensitive instructions,
P, the set of divergence points
f, the distance estimation function
1: for D = 1 to MaxDist
2: for sensitive instructions I ∈ S
3: if ∃ divergence point J ∈ P
at distance D from I
4: symbolically execute program starting
from J, without restriction to a
single path, with depth bound f(D)
Figure 5.2: Algorithm used by zesti to explore additional paths.
5.2.2 Exploring Additional Paths Around Sensitive Operations
The version of zesti described thus far has the disadvantage of being highly dependent
on the thoroughness of the regression test suite. While a quality test suite is expected
to test all program features, it is likely that not all corner cases are taken into account.
Our analysis of Coreutils (§5.4), a mature set of applications with a high quality test
suite, showed that only one out of the ten bugs previously found via symbolic execution
could be detected by the version of zesti described so far. As a result, we extended
zesti to explore paths that slightly diverge from those executed by the regression suite,
according to the likelihood they could trigger a bug.
To mitigate the path explosion problem, zesti carefully chooses divergent paths via
two mechanisms: (1) it only diverges close to sensitive instructions, i.e instructions that
might contain a bug, and (2) it chooses the divergence points in order of increasing
distance from the sensitive instruction. The key idea behind this approach is to exercise
sensitive instructions on slightly different paths, with the goal of triggering a bug if the
respective instructions contain one. Choosing a close divergence point ensures that only
a small effort is needed to reach the same instruction again.
zesti identifies sensitive instructions dynamically. As it executes the concrete program
path, it keeps track of all instructions that might cause an error on alternative executions.
We consider two types of sensitive instructions: memory accesses and divisions. We
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treat all pointer dereferences as sensitive, while for divisions we only consider those with
a symbolic denominator as sensitive. At the llvm level, zesti treats as sensitive all
memory accesses to symbolic addresses, as well as those (concrete or symbolic) memory
accesses preceded by a GetElementPtr instruction, and all division and modulo operations
with symbolic denominators. While we currently track only sensitive memory accesses
and divisions, we could also extend the technique to other types of sensitive operations,
such as assertions.
To comprehensively exercise the sensitive instructions with different inputs, zesti tries
to follow alternative execution paths that reach these instructions. To this end, it
identifies all points along the concrete path where execution can diverge, i.e. the branches
depending on symbolic input. zesti then prioritises the divergence points in increasing
order of distance from sensitive instructions and uses them as starting points for symbolic
execution. Figure 5.2 outlines the strategy used by zesti. Line 1 goes through distances
from 1 to a user-specified maximum and line 2 iterates through all sensitive instructions.
If any divergence point is found at the current distance from the current instruction, it is
used to start a depth-bounded symbolic execution run, with bound f(D). The function f
should be a function that closely overestimates the distance between the divergence point
and the sensitive instruction on an alternative path. A function which underestimates
this distance will give an SE depth bound too small to reach the sensitive instruction,
while a function that largely overestimates it would needlessly increase zesti’s overhead.
(However, note that not all additional paths explored by zesti are guaranteed to reach
the sensitive instruction.) We empirically found that a linear function works well, and
in our experiments we used f(D) = 2D.
As an optimisation, line 2 of the algorithm considers sensitive instructions in decreasing
order of distance from the program start. This favours the exploration of deeper states
first, on the premises that (1) deeper states are more interesting because they exhibit
the functionality exercised by the test suite as opposed to the shallow states that are
often related to command-line parsing or input validation, and (2) standard symbolic
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execution is less likely to be able to reach those states in reasonable time due to path
explosion.
Intuitively, the metric used by zesti to measure the distance between two execution
points needs to estimate the effort required by symbolic execution to reach one point
from the other. To this end, zesti defines the distance between two instructions in a
way similar to katch, as the number of branches between the instructions. Different
from katch, zesti only counts branches where inputs could allow execution to follow
either side of the branch. This metric captures the number of points where the program
could have taken a different path (and which zesti could explore), and is inherently
insensitive to large blocks of code that use only concrete data. Note that katch and
zesti use the instruction distance for different purposes: guiding, respectively bounding
symbolic execution.
In practice, the optimal maximum distance (MaxDist in Figure 5.2) for which to run
zesti is hard to determine. Using a small value may miss bugs, while using a large
value may be too time-consuming and leave no time to execute the rest of the tests
within the allocated time budget. Our approach to solve this problem is to allocate a
certain time budget to the entire testing process and use an iterative deepening approach:
conceptually, all the tests are first executed without exploring any additional paths, then
up to distance 1, 2, 3, etc., until the time budget expires.
To illustrate zesti’s exploration of additional paths, consider again the code in Fig-
ure 5.1. In the previous section we showed how zesti finds the bug starting from a
test that calls function f with an argument smaller than 100. We now show how it can
find the bug for any argument value. For values smaller than 100, the previous analysis
applies and the bug is found without having to explore divergent paths. Therefore, we
only discuss arguments greater than or equal to 100. Figure 5.3 shows the same code,
annotated by zesti, when executed using such an argument. While running the function,
zesti records all the sensitive instructions (S), and divergence points (D) being executed
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Depth Code InstrType
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
int v [ 1 0 0 ] ;
void f ( int x ) {
0 i f ( x > 99) D
x = 99 ;
1 v [ x ] = 0 ; S
}
Figure 5.3: Code snippet showcasing an execution generated by an input x > 99,
annotated by zesti. The Depth column records the distance from the start of the
execution, and the InstrType column keeps track of divergence points (D) and sensitive
instructions (S).
Depth Code InstrType
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
int v [ 1 0 0 ] ;
void f ( int x ) {
0 i f ( x > 99) { D1
1 i f ( x > 199) D2
return ;
x = 99 ;
}
2 v [ x ] = 0 ; S
}
Figure 5.4: Code snippet showcasing an execution generated by an input 99 < x ≤ 199,
annotated by zesti. The Depth and InstrType columns have the same meaning as in
Figure 5.3.
(InstrType field), and computes their distance from the start of the execution (Depth
field).
After running the entire function, zesti looks for instructions labelled as sensitive located
at distance 1 after a divergence point (i.e., the difference between their Depth fields is 1),
and finds instruction v[x] = 0 with corresponding divergence point if (x > 99). These
steps correspond to lines 2 and 3 of Figure 5.2. zesti then starts bounded symbolic
execution from D (line 4 of Figure 5.2). The new path discovered corresponds to an
input that makes the code take the (empty) else branch at D, i.e. a value smaller than
100. On this path x is no longer set to 99 but is used directly to index v. When executing
the sensitive instruction v[x] = 0, zesti checks whether a violation can occur based on
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the current path condition, and finds that a negative function argument causes a memory
violation.
To further illustrate zesti’s algorithm, we consider the slightly more complicated code
snippet in Figure 5.4. The code contains an additional if statement that creates a new
divergence point D2. Assuming a test input between 100 and 199, the sensitive instruction
is at distance 1 from divergence point D2 and at distance 2 from D1. Therefore, zesti
first considers D2, and explores its then path, which does not trigger the bug. Going
further, it finds D1 which leads to the bug as in the previous example.
5.2.3 Improving Efficiency by Discarding Test Cases
An interesting question is how sensitive zesti is to the program test suite. The time in
which zesti finds a bug depends on three main factors: the number of tests that are
run, the percentage of them that expose the bug, and the minimum distance at which
the bug is found.
As discussed above, because the distance at which a certain test case exposes the bug
is difficult to predict, zesti first checks the concrete execution path and then uses an
iterative deepening approach to check divergent paths. Under this strategy, the only
other parameter that zesti can vary is the number of test cases that are run. In the
rest of this section, we provide a theoretical estimate of the probability of finding a bug
if zesti runs only a randomly chosen fraction of the test suite. Section 5.4.3 evaluates
this probability in practice.
Creating a sub-test suite out of the initial test suite by randomly picking tests is an
instance of the urn model without replacement [49], i.e. the marbles (tests) are not
replaced in the urn (initial test suite) once picked. Assuming there exists a bug, and
that the bug can be exposed at some minimum distance, consider that the urn model
has the following parameters: N – the total number of tests, m – the number of tests
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which expose the bug at the minimum distance, and k – the number of tests picked. The
probability distribution which characterises the number of successes (i.e. tests which find
the bug at the minimum distance) in the sequence of k picks is called the hypergeometric
distribution [49].
In terms of this model, we are interested in the probability of having at least one success,
which is 1− P (failure), the probability of having only failures:
P (success) = 1− P (failure) = 1−
(
N −m
k
)/(
N
k
)
where the fraction denominator represents the total number of possible test combinations
and the numerator represents the number of combinations which contain zero successes.
Figure 5.5 plots the probability of finding a bug using a subset of a hypothetical initial
test suite of 100 test cases for three fractions of tests exposing the bug: 6%, 10% and
30%, which are representative for the programs that we analysed with zesti (see §5.4).
As this graph shows, it is possible to discard a large fraction of the test suite while still
finding the bug with high probability. For example, for a test suite of size 100, in order
to find the bug with at least 90% probability, it is enough to run only 7 (when m=30%),
20 (when m=10%), and 32 tests (when m=6%). If the minimum distance at which the
bug is found is relatively large, discarding a large number of tests can have a big positive
impact on zesti’s performance, without significantly lowering the probability of finding
the bug. In Section 5.4.3 we show that our analysis holds in practice by examining the
test suite characteristics of real programs.
5.3 Implementation
Like katch, zesti is integrated in the klee symbolic execution engine [16]; a user
can choose whether to run zesti via a command line switch. When enabled, zesti
intercepts all calls that create symbolic data, (e.g., read from a file), and records the
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Figure 5.5: Probability to find a bug using a randomly picked fraction of an initial test
suite of 100 test cases. The three lines show the probability considering that 6%, 10%
and respectively 30% of the initial tests find the bug.
concrete value of the variables in a shadow data structure. zesti also intercepts all
calls made to klee’s constraint solver, via a custom concretising module inserted in
klee’s solver chain between the front-end and the query optimisers. When enabled, this
module replaces all symbolic variables in a query with their concrete values and evaluates
the resulting concrete expression, obtaining a value that is then returned directly back
to klee. This implementation allows enabling and disabling symbolic execution by
disabling and respectively enabling zesti’s concretizing module. The module is always
disabled before executing a sensitive operation such as a memory access and re-enabled
afterwards. This permits checking sensitive operations symbolically while executing the
rest of the program concretely.
In order to explore paths around sensitive instructions, zesti associates with each
program state that is not on the concrete path a time-to-live (TTL) value which keeps
track of how long this state continues to be executed before it is suspended. This
mechanism allows executing states in any order and guarantees execution for the exact
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desired distance. The TTL uses the same metric used to measure distances between
program states, i.e. symbolic branch count. It is initialised with the distance for which
the state has to be executed, and decremented whenever the state is forked as a result
of a symbolic branch condition.
zesti also implements its own state prioritization algorithm based on a breadth-first
traversal of the state space, consistent with the distance metric used. The algorithm
is implemented as a searcher, a pluggable abstraction used by klee to encapsulate the
prioritization logic. This approach decouples the search algorithm from the symbolic
execution functionality and allows updating or replacing the implementation with ease.
5.4 Experimental Evaluation
This section covers the results obtained with zesti, describing our benchmarks and
methodology (§5.4.1), bugs found (§5.4.2), and quantifying the test improvements and
overhead of using zesti (§5.4.3).
5.4.1 Benchmarks
To evaluate zesti, we used three different software suites:
1) GNU Coreutils 6.10, a suite of commonly-used UNIX utilities such as ls, cat and
cp. Coreutils consists of a total of 89 individual programs and has a comprehensive
regression test suite totalling 393 individual tests obtaining overall 67.7% line
coverage. We used the older 6.10 version in order to facilitate the comparison
against klee, which was previously used to comprehensively check this version
of Coreutils [16]. The largest Coreutils program (ls) has 1429 effective lines of
code (ELOC) but also uses part of a monolithic library shared by all the utilities,
making it hard to compute an accurate line count. We therefore employed the same
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approach used by klee’s authors, of computing the number of LLVM instructions
after compiler optimisations are applied (especially the dead code elimination pass).
This yields 20,700 instructions for ls.2
2) libdwarf 20110612, a popular open-source library for inspecting DWARF debug
information in object files. libdwarf has 13,585 ELOC as reported by gcov and
31,547 LLVM instructions, as reported by klee. Its test suite consists of two
parts: 88 manually-created tests and a larger number of automatically-generated
tests obtained by exhaustively mixing common command-line arguments and input
files, achieving in total 68.6% line coverage.
3) readelf 2.21.53, a component of GNU binutils for examining ELF object files,
included in most Linux distributions. readelf has 9,938 ELOC and 30,070 LLVM
instructions, and comes with a small test suite of only seven tests obtaining 24% line
coverage. One reason we included this benchmark was to see how zesti performs
with a weaker regression suite. The other was that both libdwarf and readelf
need large inputs (executable files), which would make a pure symbolic execution
choke. For example, executing libdwarf using klee and a relatively small, 512
byte input file consumes all available memory on our test machine within a few
tens of minutes.
To test these programs, we imposed a per-test time limit dependent on program com-
plexity: we chose 15 minutes for the Coreutils programs and 30 minutes for libdwarf
and readelf. For libdwarf, we used the 88 manual tests and 12 of the automatically-
generated ones, picked to increse the diversity of the tests’ command line arguments. We
ran all libdwarf experiments on a 64bit Fedora 16 Xeon E3-1280 machine with 16GB of
RAM, while the rest were performed on a 64bit Ubuntu 10.04 i5-650 machine with 8GB
of RAM.
2Line count and coverage information was obtained using gcov 4.4.3 and LLVM 2.9. Numbers can
vary slightly between different versions.
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5.4.2 Bugs Found
zesti found a total of 58 bugs, out of which 52 were previously unknown. The new bugs
were reported to the maintainers and most of them have already been fixed by the time
of this writing. Table 5.1 shows a summary of the bugs found by zesti, along with the
distance from the concrete path and the depth at which they were found. We compute
the depth as the number of visited symbolic branches from the program start where both
sides could be explored, as this is a rough estimation of the effort required by standard
symbolic execution to find the bug. If the same bug is discovered by two or more test
cases we report the minimum distance and for equal distances the minimum depth. Both
the minimum distance and depth are influenced by program inputs; it may be possible
to reach the bugs by traversing fewer symbolic branches when using other inputs.
Table 5.1: Bugs found by zesti along with the distance (from the concrete test path)
and the depth (from the program start) at which the bug was found. New bugs are in
bold.
Bug no. Location Distance Min Depth
Coreutils
1 cut.c:267 0 65
2 printf.c:188 1 9
3 seq.c:215 1 7
4 paste.c:107 1 8
5 mkdir.c:192 6 9
6 mknod.c:169 8 12
7 mkfifo.c:117 6 10
8 md5sum.c:213 10 45
libdwarf
9 dwarf form.c:458 2 491
10 dwarf form.c:503 0 1229
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Bug no. Location Distance Min Depth
11 dwarf form.c:525 0 490
12 dwarf elf access.c:663 0 382
13 dwarf elf access.c:664 0 383
14 dwarf arange.c:160 0 319
15 dwarf arange.c:179 0 321
16 dwarf util.c:90 0 746
17 dwarf util.c:396 0 923
18 dwarf elf access.c:640 0 495
19 dwarf print lines.c:385 0 514
20 dwarf global.c:305 0 2057
21 dwarf global.c:239 0 1508
22 dwarf global.c:267 2 400
23 dwarf leb.c:58 0 396
24 dwarf leb.c:62 1 650
25 dwarf leb.c:69 1 650
26 dwarf leb.c:128 1 650
27 esb.c:117 0 1248
28 print die.c:1523 0 1292
29 dwarf util.c:116 0 488
30 dwarf util.c:363 0 1248
31 dwarf util.c:418 0 498
32 dwarf query.c:325 0 648
33 dwarf abbrev.c:119 0 543
34 dwarf frame2.c:936 1 376
35 dwarf frame2.c:948 0 389
36-48 dwarf line.c:*3 * *
3Bugs were found at 13 different locations in dwarf line.c. For brevity we omit the details.
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Bug no. Location Distance Min Depth
readelf
49 readelf.c:5020 0 134
50 readelf.c:10140 0 285
51 readelf.c:10600 0 73
52 readelf.c:10607 5 51
53 dwarf.c:182 0 277
54 dwarf.c:549 0 276
55 dwarf.c:2596 0 585
56 elfcomm.c:69 0 287
57 elfcomm.c:142 0 258
58 elfcomm.c:149 0 261
We describe below three representative errors found by zesti, and then compare its
bug-finding ability against standard symbolic execution.
cut case study: The bug found in the cut utility is a memory access violation. The
test leading to its discovery uses the command line arguments -c3-5,6- --output-d=:
file.inp. The -c argument specifies two ranges, from the 3rd to the 5th character and
from the 6th character to the end of the line. Internally, cut allocates a buffer that is
later indexed by the range endpoints. Its size is computed as the maximum of the right
endpoints across all ranges. However, in this case, the ranges unbounded to the right are
incorrectly not considered in the computation. Therefore the value 6 is used to index
a (zero-based) vector of only 6 elements. However, because the cut implementation
uses a bitvector, allocations are inherently done in chunks of 8 elements and the bug
is not triggered by the test input (and thus a tool such as Valgrind could not find it).
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Table 5.2: A one byte corruption at offset 0x1073 in a libdwarf test file, which causes a
division by zero.
Offset Original Buggy
0000 7F 45 4C 46 7F 45 4C 46
. . . . . . . . .
1070 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00
. . . . . . . . .
2024 69 74 00 69 74 00
However, zesti detects the problem by deriving a new input which triggers the bug,
namely -c3-5,8- --output-d=: file.inp.
libdwarf case study: One of the bugs found in libdwarf is a division by zero, caused by
improper handling of debug information data. Before reading the debug aranges section,
libdwarf computes the size of each entry by looking at two fields in the executable file:
the address size and the segment size. The entry size is computed using the formula
entry size = 2 ∗ address size + segment size. A check is then made to ensure that
the section size is a multiple of the entry size via a modulo operation, which causes an
exception when the entry size equals zero.
Table 5.2 shows the input generated by zesti by changing one byte in the original test
file. The byte corresponds to the address size, which is changed from 4 to 0 (the segment
size is already 0). The new file causes the division by zero when passed to libdwarf.
One advantage of zesti over standard symbolic execution is that it can generate well-
formed inputs. While symbolic execution can only use the current path constraints to
generate an input, leaving all unconstrained data to a default value, zesti creates an
input that matches as close as possible the test data, while still reproducing the bug.
The feedback to our bug reports indicates that this approach creates inputs that are
easier to understand by programmers.
printf case study: zesti found a previously unknown bug in the printf program,
a utility that prints formatted text in a similar fashion to the printf libc function.
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The bug was found at distance 1, i.e., zesti had to flip the outcome of one branch in
order to trigger it. The bug resides in a program feature that interprets a character
as its integer ASCII code if preceded by a single or double quote. The implementation
incorrectly assumes that all quotes are followed by at least one character; when a lone
quote is provided as input, an off-by-one memory access is performed. zesti infers from
the printf %c x test, the input printf %d ’, which triggers the bug.
Comparison with standard symbolic execution: In terms of bug-finding capabil-
ities, zesti and klee enjoy different advantages. On the one hand, zesti is able to
avoid certain scalability problems that symbolic execution is facing, by using the paths
executed by the regression suite to reach interesting program states. For example, zesti
was able to find forty bugs in libdwarf and ten in readelf, while klee was not able
to find any of them, because it ‘got lost’ in the large program state space, ending up
consuming all available memory on our test machine. The large depth at which the
libdwarf and readelf bugs are found in the symbolic state tree (Min Depth column in
Table 5.1) shows that symbolic execution needs to search through a significantly larger
number of states. For example, to find a bug at depth 100 requires searching through
roughly 290 times more states than it does for a bug at depth 10.
On the other hand, four of the bugs found by klee were not detected by zesti, showing
zesti’s limitations. One of the bugs, found in the tac utility, is only triggered when
providing more than one input file to the program. Because none of the tests do so, the
buggy code is never executed in the inconsistent state. The two bugs found by klee in
ptx are missed because the regression suite does not contain any tests for this program.
Finally, the bug in the pr utility was not found due to the highly solver-intensive test
inputs, which were consuming all the allocated time budget on the concrete path, not
allowing zesti to explore beyond it in the allocated time budget. However, note that
the input specifications used by klee could have been used to create seed inputs that
could have allowed zesti to find these bugs.
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Figure 5.6: Number of unique (by line of code) and total checks performed by zesti on
Coreutils 6.10.
5.4.3 Symbolic Bug Checks and Performance Overhead
Symbolic bug checks: One measure of zesti’s effectiveness is the number of sym-
bolic checks (in our case memory access checks) made when running a regression suite.
Figure 5.6 shows the number of total and unique checks performed for each program in
the Coreutils suite when running zesti on the regression suite with distance 0 (i.e.,
with no additional paths explored) and a timeout of two minutes per program execution.
Uniqueness was determined solely through the line of code that triggers the check.
Figure 5.6 shows 46 bars, one for each Coreutils application in which zesti performed
symbolic checks while running the regression suite. The rest of the Coreutils programs
do not provide any opportunities for such checks because they either are too simple (e.g.,
yes), do not take user input, or do not use it to access memory, (e.g., id, uname). This
does not represent a limitation of zesti but instead shows that not all programs are
susceptible to memory access bugs.
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Figure 5.7: zesti execution overhead compared to klee as an interpreter, when run
with distance 0 on the Coreutils regression suite.
Overhead of zesti’s checks: Under the same setup, we also measured the time
taken by zesti to run each test in the regression suite. To compute zesti’s overhead,
we use as baseline klee as an interpreter only, i.e. without any symbolic data. Because
no symbolic data is introduced, klee uses its system call models, object management
system and the same internal program representation as in symbolic execution mode but
follows only one execution path and does not use the constraint solver.
To eliminate potential inconsistencies, we only consider tests that complete successfully,
as reported by the regression suite. This eliminates 21 tests that result in zesti timeouts
and a small number of early program exits due to imperfections in uClibc or klee’s
models, which would otherwise add noise to our experiments.
The results are presented in Figure 5.7, which shows one pair of bars for each program
execution: one for the time taken by the interpreter, and one for the time taken by zesti.
The times are sorted by interpreter time. The last two tests, not completely shown, take
250 seconds to terminate under the interpreter and have less than 1% overhead under
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Table 5.3: Bug distance distribution for the bugs found by zesti in Coreutils and the
number of tests available for each programs (#T). The percentage of tests that find
each bug at the minimum distance is in bold. The Not found value corresponds to not
finding the bug in 15 minutes (60 minutes for md5sum).
cut printf md5sum mkdir mknod mkfifo paste seq
#T 163 17 44 22 1 1 8 33
D0 9.2% – – – – – – –
D1 – 17.6% – – – – 50.0% 33.3%
D2 – 5.9% – – – – – –
D3 – 5.9% – – – – – 3.0%
D4 – – – – – – – 9.1%
D5 – – – – – – – 3.0%
D6 – – – 11.3% – 100% – 9.1%
D7 – – – – – – – –
D8 – – – 4.5% 100% – – 3.0%
D9 – 17.6% – 4.5% – – – –
D10 – – 13.6% – – – – 18.2%
D11 – – – – – – 50.0% –
D12 – – – – – – – 6.1%
Not Found 90.8% 53.0% 86.4% 79.7% – – – 15.2%
zesti. We see that for most tests, the execution times are virtually identical for klee
and zesti. However, there are several executions for which zesti takes significantly
more time, due to the constraint solver queries that it issues while making the symbolic
checks. Finally, note that the interpreter time adds significant overhead on top of native
execution (which for Coreutils usually takes only milliseconds per program execution),
and one way to improve zesti’s performance is to speed up the interpreter (which in
klee is not optimised, because in standard symbolic execution it is rarely a bottleneck).
Effect of discarding test cases: Table 5.3 shows the size of the test suite for
each application from the Coreutils utilities in which zesti found a bug (#T), and
the distribution of all available tests for each program, relative to the distance at which
they exposed the bug, from zero to twelve (D0-D12). The Not found value corresponds
to not finding the bug in 15 minutes (60 minutes for md5sum). For example, 9.2% of the
163 cut tests allow zesti to find the bug at distance 0, while the rest of 90.8% do not
expose the bug in 15 minutes.
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Figure 5.8: Probability to find the Coreutils bugs at the minimum distance, relative to
the size of a randomly chosen sub-test suite.
Based on the information in Table 5.3 and using the formula presented in Section 5.2.3,
we plotted in Figure 5.8 the probability of finding the bug at the minimum distance for
each of these applications, relative to the size of a randomly chosen sub-test suite. It
can be noticed that the worst scenarios correspond to the printf and md5sum programs,
where more than half of the tests are needed to have at least 90% confidence in finding
the bug. For the rest of the programs, a confidence of at least 90% can be achieved by
using roughly one third (or fewer) of the tests. This indicates that in practice, it might
be possible to improve zesti’s efficiency—without significantly affecting the probability
of finding a bug—by randomly discarding a large part of the test suite. libdwarf’s test
suite corroborates these results, while readelf has a test suite too small to be considered
for this analysis.
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5.5 Conclusion
We have presented zesti, a lightweight symbolic execution-based tool that automatically
improves regression test suites with the ability to reason about all possible input values
on paths executed by the test suite, as well as explore additional paths around sensitive
instructions. zesti approaches testing from two different angles: first, it significantly
broadens the number of bug checks performed by a regression suite and therefore the
number of bugs found. Second, by using the regression suites as a starting point, zesti
provides an effective solution for guiding the exploration of the symbolic search space.
As a result of these features, we were able to successfully apply zesti to three popular
software systems—GNU Coreutils, readelf, and libdwarf—where it found 52 previously
unknown errors, including two in the Coreutils suite, which was previously checked
thoroughly via symbolic execution.
We believe our technique can be effectively integrated with existing regression suites, and
could help bridge the gap between standard regression testing and symbolic execution,
by providing a lightweight, incremental way of combining the two techniques.
We are making our tool available as open-source at http://srg.doc.ic.ac.uk/projects/
zesti.
107
Chapter 6
Related Work
The techniques behind katch and zesti can be analysed from two perspectives: they
aim at scaling symbolic execution using regression tests while at the same time they
improve the effectiveness of regression testing using symbolic execution. We structure
this section by examining the two perspectives in turn, and finally discussing other
related techniques.
6.1 Symbolic Execution
Both katch and zesti are based on symbolic execution: katch uses it to synthesise
inputs which execute a given program location, while zesti uses it to perform thorough
safety checks, guided by regression test inputs. We discuss each technique in turn.
katch
Synthesising inputs which cover a target is an essential problem in test generation and
debugging and has been addressed through a variety of techniques, including symbolic
execution, dependence analysis, iterative relaxation and search-based software testing,
among others [7, 26,38,86,94,96,102].
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Borrowing ideas from the state of the art in these areas, katch treats the task as an
optimisation problem for which it tries to compute an optimal solution. More exactly,
it attempts to minimise the control-flow distance between the currently executing state
and the target. For any reachable target, the minimum distance is zero, achieved when
executing it. Guided by this distance and various heuristics based on program analysis,
katch explores new paths using symbolic execution seeded with existing test inputs.
Our technique fits within the paradigms of longitudinal and differential program analy-
sis [67,92], in which the testing effort is directed toward the parts of a program that have
changed from one version to the next, i.e. software patches. In particular, differential
symbolic execution [71] introduces a general framework for using symbolic execution to
compute the behavioural characterisation of a program change, and discusses several
applications, including regression test generation.
The work most closely related to katch is that on directed symbolic execution. Xu
and Rothermel introduced directed test suite augmentation [96], in which existing test
suites are combined with dynamic symbolic execution to exercise uncovered branches
in a patch. The technique is similar to the greedy step in katch, without any of our
additional analyses. Given an uncovered branch si → di and a test case that reaches si,
the technique uses dynamic symbolic execution to try to generate a test case that executes
the branch, and then repeats this process until no more branches can be covered. The
technique depends on the availability of tests that reach the source node of an uncovered
branch and do not constrain the input to take only the already covered branch, while
our approach tries to actively steer execution toward the patch by combining the greedy
exploration with informed path regeneration techniques and definition switching.
Researchers have proposed several improvements to this technique: eXpress [86] prunes
CFG branches which provably do not lead to the patch; directed symbolic execution [58]
introduces call-chain-backward symbolic execution as a guiding technique for symbolic
execution and statically-directed test generation [7] uses the size of the target’s backward
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slice reachable from the current state as an estimate for the likelihood of reaching it.
Directed incremental symbolic execution [72] is a related technique which improves the
efficiency of symbolic execution when having to analyse only the differences between
two program versions. It can dynamically prune program paths which exercise the same
behaviours in two program versions, and could be combined with katch if multiple
behaviourally different inputs which cover the patch are desired.
While it is difficult to accurately compare these techniques with katch or among each
other, we believe that katch improves upon previous work in several ways. First,
by using the definition switching heuristic, katch takes into account more than the
currently explored set of paths—and reasoning about unexecuted statements is critical
for reaching certain targets. Second, informed path regeneration uses a “surgical”
approach to reaching previously infeasible states by making changes to exactly those
variables involved in infeasible branch conditions. Third, our evaluation is performed on
significantly more patches than in prior work, which gives a better insight into the
strengths and limitations of such a technique. Finally, we believe katch could be
combined with some of these prior approaches, e.g. it could dynamically prune paths
that are shown not to lead to the target.
zesti
zesti is designed to be a testing tool that integrates seamlessly in the software de-
velopment life cycle, similar in spirit to Valgrind, but more effective through the use
of symbolic reasoning. The idea of augmenting concrete executions with the ability to
reason symbolically about potential violations was first proposed in [55], which introduces
a technique that keeps track of lower and upper bounds of integer variables, and of the
NUL character in strings. Based on this information, it can flag bugs such as buffer
overflows and incorrect uses of libc string functions. The technique can only reason
about limited types of constraints, and does not explore any additional paths.
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Two related approaches, which lend themselves to regression test seeding are concolic
testing [35, 77] and whitebox fuzz testing [36]. Concolic testing starts from the path
executed by a concrete input and then systematically flips the truth value of the branch
conditions collected on that path. Previous research has shown that the coverage and
bug-finding abilities of concolic testing can be improved by combining it with random
testing [59] or with well-formed inputs [36], and the effectiveness of fault-localization can
be increased by aiming to maximize the similarity with the path constraints of faulty
executions [4]. Combining concolic execution with manual test suites was first proposed
in [50], where it was augmented by assertion hoisting in order to increase the number
of bug checks, and then explored in [95], in which it was compared against a genetic
algorithm test augmentation technique. zesti extends previous work by proposing
techniques that explore paths around potentially dangerous instructions executed by
the regression suite, by providing an analysis of the sensitivity of this approach to the
quality of the test suite, and by presenting a thorough evaluation on real and complete
regression suites of several popular applications.
By identifying potentially dangerous operations and performing depth-bounded sym-
bolic execution around them, zesti limits the program state space that is symbolically
explored, making our approach scalable. Other solutions for limiting or prioritising
the symbolic program exploration use orthogonal approaches. For example, directed
symbolic execution methods [7, 21, 58, 72, 86, 96] limit exploration by trying to target
specific parts of a program, as discussed above. Redundant state detection [11, 14]
aims at identifying and discarding states that can be proven to be redundant, e.g.
they would execute again a previously explored path. Dynamic state merging [54]
studies the opportunities and trade-offs of combining execution states that have different
constraints and reach the same program location. Veritesting [5] combines dynamic and
static symbolic execution, decreasing the number of paths explored at the expense of
more complex constraints. Compositional dynamic test generation [34] uses function
summaries to speed up symbolic execution by reusing them when possible instead of
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actually executing the function code. The technique was later refined to compute the
summaries on demand [2]. Selective symbolic execution [20] minimises the code which
needs to be executed symbolically by separating the code of the system under test
in a symbolic and concrete part, and seamlessly transitioning back and forth between
symbolic and concrete execution.
6.2 Regression Testing
Research on improving regression testing generally falls under four main categories:
(1) finding redundant tests [40], (2) ordering tests for finding defects earlier [84], (3) se-
lectively running only relevant tests on new program versions [75] and (4) enhancing a
system’s test suite as the system evolves [9, 39,76,78,86,100]. The first three categories
address the problem of high resource usage in regression testing, which usually occurs
in mature systems which have accumulated a large number of tests during their life-
time. They are orthogonal and can be combined with our techniques when targeting a
particular part of the program.
The state-of-the-art for enhancing a system’s test suite combines control- and data-
dependence chain analysis and partial symbolic execution to identify tests that are likely
to exercise the effects of changes to a program [76]. This approach targets a more
complex adequacy criterion than statement coverage by requiring the generated tests
not only to execute the change, but also infect the program state and propagate to the
output. Making this approach tractable requires a reasonably small set of differences
between program versions and a depth-bounded analysis on dependence chains. Another
technique [78] for achieving the same adequacy criterion uses a search-based approach,
relying on evolutionary algorithms and a fitness function based on structural coverage,
object distance and control-flow distance.
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While our approach could be used for test augmentation, we see zesti and katch
primarily as bug-finding techniques that can increase the effectiveness of regression suites
by combining them with symbolic execution, following the manner in which dynamic
execution tools such as Valgrind are often integrated with existing test suites.
6.3 Other Related Techniques
Search-based software testing (SBST) [29, 62, 94, 99] is an area of research which
applies the principles of search-based software engineering to testing. Generally speaking,
SBST formulates a testing task as an optimisation problem, and finds an approxi-
mate solution by exploring the program state space using a metaheuristic algorithm in
conjunction with a fitness metric. For example, EXYST [37] uses genetic algorithms
to automatically generate system-level tests and find bugs in GUI applications, by
optimising a code coverage-based fitness criterion, without triggering false positives,
and requiring only lightweight instrumentation.
katch and zesti share characteristics with SBST. First, our notion of estimated distance
is similar to that of fitness in SBST. Second, the idea of reusing existing test cases has
also been successfully employed in SBST [29, 99]. However, unlike SBST, we use a set
of specialised heuristics which operate based on symbolic constraints and we search for
an exact solution. Researchers have already started to develop techniques that combine
SBST and dynamic symbolic execution [6,28,30,60,93] and similar ideas could be applied
for the purpose of patch testing.
Fuzzing is a testing technique that involves providing random data to a program
while monitoring its execution for abnormal behaviour. In its simplest form—black-
box fuzzing— it consists of sending random bits to a program, either as command line
arguments, input files, environment variables, network packets etc., but assuming no
knowledge of either the input or the program. Miller et al. [63] were among the first to
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apply this technique to actual programs. However, this basic approach is inadequate for
programs whose valid inputs are scattered throughout the input space, e.g. compilers, or
for programs whose inputs follow a very specific pattern, e.g. a checksum for a network
packet or a magic field that identifies the input type. In these cases, a completely random
input will almost always be invalid and thus only exercise the program’s input validation
code. This problem has been addressed by leveraging information regarding the input or
the program structure. Solutions which leverage only the input structure fall in the gray-
box fuzzing category: mutating valid inputs [68, 85], using grammar-based fuzzing [98]
and a combination of the two [44]. Such a combination is similar to katch, in that
it generates new program inputs starting from regression tests. However, while katch
uses the program structure and symbolic execution to reach a specific target, fuzzing
randomly creates new inputs using a grammar which has to be provided by the user.
Finally, solutions which take advantage of the program structure [32, 36] systematically
explore different paths and find boundary conditions, similarly in principle to concolic
execution. This approach, dubbed white-box fuzzing, can, similarly to katch and zesti,
reason more thoroughly about the program’s behaviour and generally finds deeper bugs
at the cost of increased complexity and overhead introduced by constraint solving and
the use of program instrumentation. Given the same time budget, black-box fuzzing can
generate significantly more, but potentially less diverse inputs, while gray-box fuzzing is
a middle-ground between the two.
Research on automatic generation of filters based on vulnerability signatures [12,22]
addresses the problem of executing a specific target from a different angle. Given an
existing input which exploits a program vulnerability, the goal is to infer the entire
class of inputs that lead to that vulnerability. Similarly, generating inputs with the
same effect as a crashing input but which do not leak sensitive data, is used in bug
reporting to preserve user privacy [19]. In the context of automated debugging, execution
synthesis [102] and BugRedux [48] attempt to solve a similar problem: generating an
input or a path starting from a set of ‘waypoints’ through which execution has to pass.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Summary of Thesis Achievements
We briefly reiterate the main contributions of this thesis:
1) We have shown that the effectiveness of standard regression tests can be automat-
ically improved using symbolic execution-based techniques.
2) We have shown through an empirical study the suitability of these techniques to
real applications and have built a system for automatic extraction of static and
dynamic software evolution metrics from software repositories.
3) We have presented and evaluated katch, a testing technique that combines sym-
bolic execution with several novel heuristics based on program analysis that effec-
tively exploit the program structure and existing program inputs to reach specific
program points.
4) We have introduced and demonstrated zesti, a technique complementary to katch,
for reasoning about all possible input values on the paths executed by the regression
suite and for thoroughly exploring additional paths around sensitive instructions
such as dangerous memory accesses.
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7.2 Applications
The ultimate goal of our project is to make katch and zesti accessible to testers
through a simple interface. Continuous integration systems such as BuildBot1, Jenkins2
or Travis CI3 are widely adopted in industry for automating tasks such as building and
regression testing. We envision katch and zesti as “plug-ins” to such a system, working
behind the scenes, requiring little configuration and minimally disrupting the existing
development workflows.
Using katch requires providing only a simple configuration file, a build script and
a regression test suite, which already exist in most systems. When invoked, katch
automatically detects the latest source code changes, runs the existing regression tests,
checks their patch coverage, and finally creates new inputs based on the existing tests
to improve the coverage and detect more errors.
zesti on the other hand, plugs directly into this regression test suite. The regular tests
are usually executed from the command line via a make check or make test command.
Some systems also allow running the regression suite through a memory debugger such as
Valgrind, using a simple command such as make test-valgrind, in order to catch invalid
memory operations which do not result in observable errors. We envision exposing zesti
through a similar command, e.g. make test-zesti, which would enable all the additional
checks it makes.
The approach implemented by katch and zesti has several advantages: (1) it does not
require changes to the program source code or to the regression tests, as both systems
interpose transparently between the test harness and the actual program; (2) it takes
advantage of the effort put in the original test cases, as they are reused to drive symbolic
execution; and (3) for each bug found, an input that reproduces the bug is generated;
1http://buildbot.net
2http://jenkins-ci.org
3https://travis-ci.org/
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furthermore, to help developers understand the bug, this input is kept as similar as
possible to the initial test input used to drive exploration.
Unlike standalone symbolic execution, katch and zesti eliminate the guesswork in-
volved in setting up symbolic data. In particular, choosing the appropriate number and
size of symbolic inputs is non-trivial: on the one hand, small inputs may miss bugs, while
on the other hand large inputs can significantly increase execution overhead by generating
very expensive constraint solving queries, or by causing symbolic execution to spend
most of its time in uninteresting parts of code. For example, while analysing the two
Coreutils bugs detected by zesti but missed by klee, we found that carefully tuning
the symbolic input size allows standard symbolic execution to find them. Surprisingly,
one of the bugs can be found only with larger inputs, while the other only with smaller
ones. The cut bug can be found only when using two long arguments—but the original
klee tests were using a single long argument—and the printf bug can only be found
with an argument of size one—but the original klee tests used a larger size. Good
regression test suites invoke applications with representative arguments, in number, size
and value, which katch and zesti successfully exploit.
Another problem of symbolic execution is that it can get stuck in uninteresting parts
of the code, such as input parsing code, and therefore miss interesting “deep paths.”
katch and zesti solve this problem by first executing the entire program along the paths
induced by the regression tests, and then exploring adjacent program parts symbolically
driven by a control flow-based metric.
The main disadvantage of this approach is that it can take significantly more time than
natively executing the regression tests. However, our empirical analysis showed that
a good regression suite allows finding bugs close to the concrete execution path, thus
minimising the time spent symbolically executing the program. Furthermore, katch
and zesti can be tuned to specific time budgets through various configurable settings
which limit the exploration via timeouts (per-instruction, per-solver query, per-branch
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from the concrete path) or by disallowing execution beyond a certain distance. Finally,
if necessary, developers can run only a part of the test suite under zesti, often without
significantly lowering the probability of finding bugs.
One problem that we observed in the pr utility from the Coreutils suite is a very
expensive—in terms of symbolic checks—concrete path. This prevents zesti from ex-
ploring paths which diverge from the test suite in the given time budget. In the future,
we plan to incorporate in both katch and zesti heuristics for adaptively skipping
memory access and branch feasibility checks. For example, the tools could consider an
instruction correct after it has been checked for a predetermined number of times on
different paths. Similarly, they would limit the number of branches spawned by the
same static instruction. We intend to further study the trade-offs that we can make in
the symbolic state-space exploration.
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